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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the approach of the Labour government of Harold Wilson in 1969-
1970 and the Conservative government of Edward Heath from 1970 towards the war in 
Vietnam in general and towards the Paris peace process in particular. In the historiography of 
the Vietnam war, there has been little attention given to UK policy in connection with the US 
Nixon administration’s efforts to secure a “peace with honor” for America, and this dissertation 
seeks to fill a gap in the literature. As will be seen, both the Labour and Conservative 
governments were more actively involved at a diplomatic level than the historiography 
suggests. In the first place, in terms of the UK-US “special relationship”, Britain was called 
upon by America for support both in the ongoing war and the parallel peace process. In the 
Wilson-Heath period, the UK accepted the imperative of containing communism in Southeast 
Asia, where the UK retained considerable Commonwealth, economic and strategic interests. 
This dictated support for the US. At the same time, the US war was very unpopular in Britain, 
and support for the US had to be balanced against political considerations closer to home. It is 
one of the more surprising findings of this dissertation that Heath, who is often depicted as the 
most sceptical UK postwar Prime Minister about the Anglo-American relationship, was 
consistently supportive of the Nixon administration’s policy – even controversial features of 
that policy such as the 1972 Christmas bombing. However, as will be seen, Heath’s attitude 
was related to his European policy; by backing the US on Vietnam, he hoped to be able to 
maintain good UK-US relations after the UK joined the EEC. Heath did not regard UK entry 
into the EEC as building a new special relationship with Europe to take the place of the old 
UK-US one, but as an additional prop of support for the UK. Finally, in the Wilson-Heath 
period, we see the legacy of an earlier UK Vietnam peace initiative – the 1954 Geneva 
settlement which ended the French war in Vietnam. The terms of that settlement had been 
quickly violated, and Britain, along with the USSR, the co-chairs of the 1954 Geneva 
conference, assumed responsibility for restoring the situation in Vietnam along the lines of the 
1954 settlement. This sometimes required the UK to distance itself in public from aspects of 
US policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and to propose peace initiatives of its own, to the 
irritation of the Americans. Heath, however, in contrast to Wilson, refused to be overly loyal 
to 1954 and tended to back the US, as noted, in most instances. But when peace finally arrived, 
for the US at least, in 1973, the Heath government was determined not to assume any 
responsibility for its preservation in the way that the UK became entangled in the legacy of 
1954. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Britain, Anglo-American Relations  
and the Ending of the US War in Vietnam, 1969-1973 
 
The historiography of the Vietnam war, or the English-language historiography at any rate, is 
dominated by US historians who want explanations for American involvement and reasons for 
American defeat.1 Work on the British angle on the war is limited in comparison. At one level 
this is understandable as the UK was not directly involved in the fighting. At another level, 
Britain did play an important role at various times in the Vietnam story as a diplomatic actor, 
potential peacemaker, and supporter (and sometimes opposer) of American policy.  
There is currently only one major overview work on Britain and the Vietnam war, 
Sylvia Ellis’s Britain, America and the Vietnam War, but even this is not comprehensive as it 
does not go much beyond the Johnson period (1963-1969).2 On an episodic basis arguably the 
greatest focus is given to the UK contribution to ending the first – French – war in Vietnam in 
1954, and to the role of the then British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in helping avert a 
major international crisis, and potentially a world war.3 Other episodes in the Vietnam drama 
that have engaged scholars include the UK part in helping the French to restore their colonial 
                                                 
1 See Kevin Ruane, ‘Putting America in its Place? Recent Writing on the Vietnam Wars’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2002), pp.115-128.  
2 Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America and the Vietnam War (Westport: Praeger, 2004). 
3 The most recent treatment is Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones, Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and 
the 1954 Indochina Crisis (London: Bloomsbury, 2019). I am grateful to Kevin Ruane for allowing me to read an 
advance copy of this book. In addition, see James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), and various chapters and articles by Geoffrey Warner: ‘The Settlement of the Indochina War’, 
in John W. Young, ed., The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime Administration 1951-55 (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1988); ‘Britain and the Crisis over Dien Bien Phu, April 1954: the Failure of United Action’, 
and ‘From Geneva to Manila: British Policy towards Indochina and SEATO, May-September 1954’, in Lawrence 
S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud and Mark R. Rubin, eds, Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 
1954-1955 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1990). 
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position at the end of the Second World War,4 the UK role after 1954 as informal guarantor of 
the settlement that ended the French war,5 British policy in the Kennedy years as US escalation 
began slowly,6 the Wilson government’s efforts to maintain good Anglo-American relations in 
the LBJ period while simultaneously steering clear of UK combat involvement on the US side,7 
and the Wilson government’s various attempts to broker a peace settlement in the mid-to-late-
1960s.8 
 To date, the period from January 1969, when formal Vietnam peace negotiations began 
in Paris, through to the end of the US war in January 1973, has been comparatively neglected 
both from the standpoint of British policy and the perspective of Anglo-American relations. 
On the US side, this M. Res. thesis covers the first Richard Nixon administration (1969-1973), 
and on the UK side it covers the back end of Harold Wilson’s second Labour government 
(1969-1970) and the bulk of Edward Heath’s first and only Conservative government (1970-
1974). This is not to say that the Wilson-Heath period has been neglected by scholars, only that 
the issue of Vietnam is rarely if ever given sustained focus.9 In this M. Res. thesis, however, it 
takes centre-stage. At the same time, this thesis locates UK Vietnam policy within the context 
                                                 
4 Peter Neville, Britain in Vietnam, 1945-1946: Prelude to Disaster (London: Routledge, 2007); T. O. Smith, 
Britain and the Origins of the Vietnam War: UK Policy in Indo-China 1943-50 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007). 
5 Arthur Combs, ‘The Path Not Taken: The British Alternative to U.S. Policy in Vietnam, 1954–1956’, Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1995), pp.33-57. 
6 Peter Busch, All the Way with JFK: Britain, the US and the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
7 Nicholas Tarling, The British and the Vietnam War: Their Way with LBJ (Singapore: National University of 
Singapore Press, 2017); Sylvia Ellis, ‘Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War: a Not so Special 
Relationship?’, in Jonathan Hollowell, ed., Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2001). 
8 John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives 1966-1967: Marigolds, 
Sunflowers and “Kosygin Week”’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2003), pp.113-149. 
9 For example, Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, eds, The Heath Government, 1970-74: A Reappraisal (London: 
Routledge, 1996); John W. Young, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, Volume 2: International Policy 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Alex Spelling, ‘Edward Heath and Anglo–American Relations 
1970–1974: A Reappraisal’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2009), pp.638-658; Andrew Scott, Allies 
Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2011); Geraint Hughes, 
Harold Wilson's Cold War: the Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-1970 (London: Royal Historical 
Society, 2015 edition). 
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of Anglo-American relations. British policy was nearly always framed in terms of how it would 
impact on UK-US relations, and to focus purely on Vietnam would be to research this period 
of history in a vacuum that did not exist at the time. 
 To dwell on the so-called Anglo-American “special relationship” for a moment, 
historian Nigel Ashton has pointed out that ‘the term “special relationship” can hardly appear 
in public unless wrapped in commas and accompanied by a question mark’.10 In this thesis, it 
is also wrapped in speech marks and questioned because the dilemma for every UK government 
after 1945 was to find a way of ‘managing the Americans’ in what was an ambiguous, not 
straightforwardly special relationship.11 British power, military and economic, was on the 
decline after the Second World War, while America’s was on the rise. UK policymakers sought 
to maintain the closest possible relationship with the United States, as this was in Britain’s 
security interest in the Cold War, and it was also vital in terms of UK economic viability given 
the centrality of the US to the global economy. The problem for the British came when US 
policy appeared dangerous or wrong. The question then became how far UK opposition to 
America should go. If the British were too critical, this risked the Americans taking offence 
and damaging relations. If the British always went along meekly with US policy, regardless of 
whether they felt it was right or wrong, that suggested that the UK had become subservient to 
America, a difficult status for a proud nation to handle.12 
 Vietnam offers a case study of this bigger issue. In 1954, for example, the British 
Conservative government strongly opposed US plans to intervene militarily to save the French 
position in Vietnam; the British feared that US intervention would trigger Chinese counter-
                                                 
10 Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: the Irony of Interdependence (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002), p.6. 
11 See Kevin Ruane and James Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans’, in Gaynor Johnson, ed., The Foreign Office 
and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2005). 
12 See the discussion of ‘power by proxy’ in David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World 
Power in the 20th Century (London: Longman, 1991), pp.177-178. 
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intervention, and possibly a world war. In the end, British opposition proved decisive, and there 
was no US military action. Instead, at the Geneva conference on Indochina, the war was 
brought to a peaceful – but as it turned out, temporary – end. The consequence for the “special 
relationship” however was very damaging and some historians have argued that the 
Eisenhower administration’s anger towards Eden and his Indochina crisis management in 1954 
contributed to the harsh way the US dealt with the UK (and Eden) during the Suez crisis two 
years later in 1956.13 A decade later, in the mid-1960s, the British Labour government was 
faced with an appeal from the US Johnson administration for UK support on the ground in 
Vietnam – Johnson wanted ‘more flags’ alongside the stars-and-stripes, and indeed Australia, 
New Zealand, South Korea and Thailand would commit troops to assist American in the war.14 
The Wilson government, however, refused to dispatch UK forces, but did offer moral support 
even though sections of the Labour party in parliament was vehemently opposed to US policy 
in Vietnam. Wilson could not fully disassociate the UK from the US due to Britain’s economic 
dependence on American economic support at a time of serious UK balance of payments 
problems. Similarly, the Wilson Labour government’s promotion of various peaceful solutions 
to the war caused resentment Washington and differences over Vietnam threatened at times to 
poison US-UK relations on a wider plane.15 
 In this thesis, there will consideration as to how the Wilson Labour government dealt 
with the Vietnam problem in 1969-1970, when US policy was directed by the new Nixon 
administration, but the greater part of the thesis will focus on the Heath Conservative 
                                                 
13 D. R. Thorpe, Eden: the Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897-1977 (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 2003), p.405; David Dutton, ‘Anthony Eden’, in T. G. Otte., ed., The Makers of British Foreign Policy: 
from Pitt to Thatcher (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.232. 
14 Fredrik Logevall, ‘Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.32, No.1 (2004), pp.103-
105 
15 Jonathan Colman, A “Special Relationship”?: Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American 
Relations “at the summit”, 1964-168 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.75-99; Geraint 
Hughes, ‘A “Missed Opportunity” for Peace? Harold Wilson, British Diplomacy and the Sunflower Initiative to 
End the Vietnam War, February 1967’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp.106-130.  
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government. Two interesting points will emerge in this connection. The first concerns the 
legacy of 1954. The Geneva settlement of the French war provided for temporary partition of 
Vietnam into a communist north and a non-communist south and for nationwide reunification 
elections in 1956. These elections did not happen as the US Eisenhower administration 
embarked on a nation-building project to turn South Vietnam into a separate anti-communist 
state. In 1960, with the formation of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, backed 
by communist North Vietnam, the US-backed government in Saigon came under severe threat. 
As the conflict began to escalate, the British, along with the Soviet Union, both of whom had 
co-chaired the 1954 conference, assumed responsibility for overseeing a return to the original 
peace settlement. This responsibility was informal but internationally recognised. Britain, more 
than the USSR, was seen as the architect of the 1954 peace and felt an obligation in that 
regard.16  
In the Wilson years, the UK’s role as Geneva co-chair, and the responsibility that went 
with it, was used by the London government as a convenient additional reason for resisting the 
Johnson administration’s pressure to become actively involved in the war on America’s side. 
To adopt a combatant role was inconsistent with the legacy of 1954, UK policymakers argued. 
As this thesis will show, in 1969-1970, the Wilson government continued to justify its 
commitment to peace in Vietnam by referencing Geneva, but unlike the Johnson period, the 
government had in place in Washington a US administration committed – at least publicly – to 
a peace agenda. The really interesting contrast is with the Heath government. At various points 
from its formation in June 1970 onwards, the Conservative government cast its approach to 
Vietnam within the framework of Geneva and presented itself as the heir of the 1954 settlement 
                                                 
16 Cable, Geneva, p.137; James Cable, ‘Improvising International Supervision in Indochina’, paper passed to my 
supervisor by James Cable, 23 September 1989, and gratefully consulted. Also on the UK role see Command 
Papers Cmnd 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict, 1945-1965 (London: 
HMSO, 1965), paragraphs 44-73. 
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and consistently proclaimed its commitment to a negotiated solution. But at several key 
moments – the Laotian crisis in 1971, and the US Christmas bombing of North Vietnam in 
1972, for instance – the Heath government showed itself to be strongly supportive of the Nixon 
administration and largely unbound in expressing that support by any legacy of 1954.  
The reason that UK support for the US in the early 1970s is noteworthy is that Edward 
Heath’s attitude towards the United States is usually regarded by historians as ‘far more 
idiosyncratic and ambivalent than that of any other post-1945 British leader’ – indeed Heath 
was ‘unique in the depths of his…coolness about the “special relationship”’.17 Heath was more 
concerned to develop a parallel “special relationship” with the European Economic Community 
(EEC), which he fully intended the UK to join, than with always cultivating the old “special 
relationship” with America.18 Heath had always disliked the term “special relationship” which 
he felt would alienate France and other Western European countries whose backing the UK 
needed for EEC entry. ‘The expression is offensive to West Europeans & to many 
Commonwealth countries,’ he wrote privately in 1963. ‘It is even harmful to us in this 
country…I shall never use it!  I completely repudiate the idea.’19 A few years later, he brought 
this view into Number 10 Downing Street and although he usually phrased himself a bit more 
diplomatically his outlook did not escape the attention of the Americans. ‘Of all British 
leaders,’ recalled Henry Kissinger, ‘Heath was the most indifferent to the American connection 
and perhaps even to Americans individually’.20  
                                                 
17 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.88; Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p.241. 
18 John Dickie, Special No More: Anglo-American Relations – Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1994), pp.144-145; Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p.139. 
19 Heath to Caccia, 12 May 1963, UK National Archives, Kew, London, FO371/169120/3. I am grateful to my 
supervisor Professor Kevin Ruane for passing this reference on to me. 
20 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), p.141. 
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However, as will be seen, while accepting the general consensus in the historiography 
regarding Heath and his approach to UK-US relations, this thesis will demonstrate that Vietnam 
was as an exception to the coolness rule, with Heath ready to go to considerable lengths to back 
America right and indeed wrong. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Vietnam, the Nixon administration,  
and UK-US relations, 1969-1970 
 
On 5 November 1968, Republican Richard Nixon narrowly won the US Presidential election. 
According to historian Jeffrey Kimball, Vietnam was integral to Nixon’s victory as his position 
on war, including a commitment to securing a peace with honour, won crucial votes.21 In his 
memoirs, William Safire of the Nixon campaign team discussed what might have happened if 
the incumbent Democratic administration had made better progress in the Vietnam peace 
negotiations which had begun in Paris in May on a US-North Vietnam basis but failed to 
blossom into full-scale four-party (US, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, National Liberation 
Front (NLF)) talks by the time of the election. ‘Nixon probably would not be President were it 
not for Thieu’, Safire concluded in a reference to South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van 
Thieu who, just a few days before polling, reneged on a previous commitment to take part in a 
four-party peace process.22  
Before Thieu’s about-turn, Nixon’s rival, Democratic Vice-President Hubert 
Humphrey, had caught up in the opinion polls as voters seemed happy to reward the Democrats 
for getting peace negotiations to the brink of starting. Later on it was shown that Nixon secretly 
sabotaged the peace process by getting a message to Thieu telling him he would get a better 
deal with Nixon rather than Humphrey in the White House. Thieu agreed, the embryonic peace 
process stalled, and President Johnson and Humphrey were left looking like they were playing 
party politics with the negotiations.23 
                                                 
21 Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), p.60. 
22 William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (New York: Doubleday, 
1975), p.88. 
23 Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 (London: Harper, 1990), p.233; John Farrell, ‘Nixon’s Vietnam 
Treachery’, New York Times, 31 December 2016. 
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It is hard to say how many votes Nixon’s sabotage actually delivered. In his campaign, 
Nixon maintained a careful balance on Vietnam to win support across the political spectrum. 
‘For doves and moderates,’ Kimball notes, ‘he spoke less of escalating military measures and 
protecting vital interests and more of taking non-military steps towards peace; for hawks and 
conservatives, he continued to talk about putting on pressure and winning the peace. For all 
Americans, he spoke of a peace with honor’.24 But what did peace with honour mean? An end 
to the fighting for the United States without making significant concessions that would 
represent disguised defeat? The maintaining of a non-communist government in Saigon after 
US forces withdrew? Regardless of the wordplay, Nixon was committed to ending the war in 
Vietnam on his terms. He had no intention of becoming ‘the first president of the United States 
to lose a war’.25 
Across the Atlantic, the UK Labour government of Harold Wilson was a close observer 
of the US election. Britain was not only America’s closest ally but a Southeast Asian power 
due to colonial/Commonwealth connections with Malaysia, Singapore, Borneo and Sarawak.26 
In addition, Wilson believed the UK had a ‘special part to play’ arising from its ongoing role 
as co-chair of the 1954 Geneva conference in the search for peace in Vietnam.27 In the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), officials studied Nixon’s campaign speeches for clues about 
his policies. The effort was frustrating due to the vague nature of Nixon’s statements. As the 
Head of the FCO Southeast Asia Department observed, ‘quotations’ from his speeches ‘could 
be used to back most options’. The British concluded that the ambiguity was ‘no 
                                                 
24 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, p.41. 
25 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London: Century, 1983), p.597. 
26 John Young, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century (London: Arnold, 1997), p.9 
27 Wilson-Gorton Meeting, 7 January 1969, PREM13/3030 
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doubt…intentional’ leaving the UK government no wiser than many others about what a Nixon 
administration would bring for Vietnam.28 
On the eve of Nixon’s January 1969 inauguration the FCO reviewed the state of Anglo-
American relations. It was normal practice to do a stocktake when a new President came into 
office. In addition, the process provides pointers to future UK policy. The paper was prepared 
by the UK Embassy in Washington in liaison with the Planning Staff of the FCO and attempted 
to assess Anglo-American relations from an objective viewpoint free of the ‘sentimental 
overtones’ relating to the “special relationship”. The memorandum predicted that the growing 
‘uniqueness’ of the United States would leave the US without peer in international affairs. With 
its economy forecast to grow by a greater amount each year than any other country, the gap 
between America and Britain in key areas such as volume of production, standards of living, 
technology and military power would inevitably increase. Only China and the Soviet Union 
could come close to the US in economic growth potential but these countries would probably 
experience difficulties trying to keep up. In view of the advance of American hegemony, 
Western Europe was likely to become ever more reliant on the United States militarily and 
economically. America itself, whose foreign policy was expected to focus increasingly on the 
triangular US-PRC-USSR relationship, would have little need for what the ‘lesser powers’ 
could offer beyond supporting US hegemony. FCO officials suspected that Britain would feel 
the brunt of this shift in power with UK influence on US policy declining and the “special 
relationship” becoming less special.29 
While accepting the UK’s status as a ‘lesser power’, the study argued that Britain still 
remained useful to the United States as it pursued its international agenda. One helpful factor 
was a common language, an obvious link but the value of Britain as an ally with whom the 
                                                 
28 Johnston to Murray, 12 November 1969, and Wilford to Murray, 17 December 1968, FCO15/1040. 
29 FCO Planning Staff memorandum, 17 January 1969, FCO32/376. 
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Americans could ‘most easily conduct a meaningful dialogue’ was not to be under-rated. The 
same went for shared cultural ancestry, an asset to a ‘comparatively rootless people’ as the 
Americans were described. However, Britain’s greatest advantage was the political influence 
it continued to wield in world affairs. Even if UK power was declining, the fact was that in the 
United States, Britain carried weight as an ally surpassing the UK’s real size or influence and 
eclipsed that of any other US partner. But these assets were waning and the study predicted 
that as Britain became less indispensable to American aims, it might have to ‘pay more for the 
right to influence the conduct of the United States’ and accept ‘increasing servitudes’. Indeed, 
the UK might shift from partner to ‘instrument of American purpose’.30 
This dilemma raised in the planning paper was not new. Every UK government since 
1945 had to wrestle with the implications of the shift in the global balance.31 Like their 
predecessors, the January 1969 FCO study looked to the future. Three main objectives were 
identified: maintaining good relations with the United States; UK economic recovery, which 
would increase its value as a US ally; and entry into the European Economic Community 
(EEC), which would give Britain an additional power-base. These goals were ‘interdependent’ 
but also potentially ‘inconsistent’. With regard to close Anglo-American relations, these were 
as ‘important as ever’ to the UK but less so to the US. This meant that the British needed to be 
‘even more careful’ about the manner and tone of exchanges with the US. If London disagreed 
with Washington on a matter of importance care was needed in conveying that disagreement 
especially in public. On the other hand, if US policy appeared dangerous or wrong it might be 
necessary to threaten to withhold UK support. This risked damaging relations but might also 
have a moderating influence on the American administration.32 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Ruane and Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans’. 
32 FCO Planning Staff memorandum, 17 January 1969, FCO32/376. 
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As for British policy on Vietnam, this remained what it had been for nearly four years. 
The UK supported the right of South Vietnam, aided by the United States, to defend herself 
against communist aggression. Equally, any constructive proposal designed to bring a peaceful 
end to the conflict was to be welcomed, indeed the British were ready to use what influence 
they had as ongoing 1954 Geneva co-chair (in tandem with the USSR) to advance the cause of 
negotiations.33 In this connection, the UK welcomed the start of a Paris-based peace process in 
January 1969 when Thieu abruptly dropped his opposition to negotiations and agreed that 
South Vietnam would participate alongside the US, DRV and NLF. However, there was to be 
no lessening of the fighting in South Vietnam as both sides tried to gain battlefield success to 
turn into diplomatic advantage.34  
The peace progress itself soon grew sterile but this did not stop the USSR criticising 
the UK’s position. According to the Soviet Union, Britain was acting contradictorily by 
claiming to champion peace while still supporting America’s war. In the view of Moscow the 
British placed higher importance on maintaining good Anglo-American relations than making 
peace.35 This criticism was not taken too seriously in London given that the USSR was 
providing North Vietnam with military aid. The FCO dismissed Soviet views as a ‘routine 
piece of anti-British propaganda’, while dismissed Moscow’s ‘topsy-turvy’ viewpoint as 
‘unworthy of consideration’.36 
But was there something to be said for the Kremlin’s claim? Was there a contradiction 
in the UK position? Could the UK support the US in a war on the one hand and still be a 
peacemaker on the other hand? J. M. Addis, the British Ambassador to the Philippines, believed 
                                                 
33 Factel 553, n.d., April 1968, FCO15/1067; Stewart memorandum, 15 January 1969, CAB129/140. 
34 Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp.16-17; Young, International Policy, p.80. 
35 Digest of Soviet press, 28 December 1968, PREM13/3030. 
36 Palliser to Maitland, 2 January 1969, and Brighty to Palliser, 7 January 1969, ibid. 
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they could not. A diplomat with long Asian experience, Addis wrote to a FCO colleague in 
December 1967 expressing concern that the validity of Britain’s co-chairmanship was 
diminishing as a result of the UK ‘aligning closely behind the US Government’s policy on 
Vietnam’. This hampered Britain when promoting ‘useful initiatives’ towards a settlement. The 
situation was not beyond repair but it needed the UK to distance itself from the United States.37 
In the event nothing really changed over the next year. Nor was it likely to change in 1969 
according to the conclusions drawn by the FCO in reappraising Anglo-American relations.38 
By prioritising relations with the US over a peace settlement the British arguably were not 
living up to their obligations under the 1954 settlement. Then again, neither were the Soviets 
in supporting North Vietnam with high-tech military aid, including IL-28 jet bombers and MiG 
fighters.39 
 
Nixon’s most famous statement during the 1968 election came when he told a rally that he 
possessed a ‘secret plan’ to end the war in Vietnam.40 According to Stanley Karnow, Nixon 
may have been misquoted (a ‘rookie wire-service reporter’ may have put a ‘jazzy lead’ on his 
account).41 In the view of other historians, Nixon’s catch-all rhetoric was the problem and at 
the least he implied that he personally held the key to bringing the war to a conclusion.42 Nixon 
himself later denied that he claimed to possess a formulated plan and that one only took shape 
once he was in the Oval Office.43 Whatever the truth, the urgent immediate goal was to pacify 
                                                 
37 Addis to Wilkinson, 18 December 1967, FCO15/1024. 
38 FCO Planning Staff memorandum, 17 January 1969, FCO32/376. 
39 Ilya Gaiduk, ‘Soviet Policy towards US Participation in the Vietnam War’, History, Vol. 81, No. 261 (1996), 
pp.48-50. 
40 Jonathan Aitken Nixon: A Life (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), p.416. 
41 Karnow, Vietnam, p.597. 
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US public opinion, especially the vocal anti-war element which had proven to be such a thorn 
in Johnson’s side. But no matter how the ultimate goal was packaged, Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, were determined to end US involvement in Vietnam 
while simultaneously avoiding defeat.44  
In his early statements as President, Nixon refused to be drawn on the details of his 
approach. At a news conference on 27 January, he stated that the US negotiating position in 
the Paris peace process was based on an armistice, mutual and guaranteed withdrawal of both 
US and North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, the exchange of prisoners of war, and 
gradual progress on a political settlement.45 As such, the Nixon administration’s outlook 
chimed with the Wilson government’s hopes for a negotiated solution to the war.46  
 
At the start of February 1969, Nixon announced that he would soon be visiting Western Europe 
to ‘underline… [his] commitment’ to close relations. He would use the French leg of his trip 
‘to review intensively the Paris peace talks’ in consultation with Henry Cabot Lodge who was 
leading the American delegation.47 Privately, Nixon wrote to Wilson to say that his visit to 
London was also ‘crucial’ because he was ‘intent on upholding the close relationship that… 
[had] long existed between British Prime Ministers and American Presidents’. In appearance, 
the “special relationship” seemed safe.48 
By mid-February, the lack of progress in the Paris negotiations had become a concern 
for the Wilson government. Speaking to the Cabinet the Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart 
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reported that the talks remained in the ‘Propaganda Stage’ with both the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (DRV, the formal name of North Vietnam) and the NLF focused on making 
speeches intended to cause difficulties for the other side.49 Lodge in fact was so frustrated by 
this posing that he wrote privately to Nixon seeking authorisation for secret parallel talks with 
the North Vietnamese to break through the propaganda barrier but Nixon was not yet ready for 
that kind of initiative.50  
The British government became involved in the Paris process after approving a visit to 
the UK by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, deputy leader of the NLF delegation in Paris, so she 
could participate in a rally of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). The Cabinet 
hoped to use her visit to persuade Madame Binh to take a more constructive view on the de-
escalation of the Vietnam war.51 However, with the announcement of Nixon’s visit, FCO 
officials grew nervous about the implications for Anglo-American relations of Binh’s presence 
in Britain.52 A brief for the Foreign Secretary noted that the ‘very close relationship’ which the 
UK government had with the US under the previous Democratic administration was already 
showing signs of ‘fading’ under the Republicans.53 As the earlier FCO stocktake observed, this 
was possibly inevitable in light of the wider shift in American foreign policy towards improved 
relations with the communist giants, particularly the push for détente with the USSR.54 The 
Nixon administration hoped that friendlier relations with the PRC and USSR would have a 
positive impact on the Vietnam situation if Moscow and Beijing were persuaded to abandon 
North Vietnam or press it to make concessions in Paris in order to improve relations with the 
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United States. However, even if Anglo-American relations were at risk of downgrading by 
Washington, the FCO saw no reason to speed the process by appearing to sympathise with the 
Vietnamese communists by hosting Madame Binh.55 
FCO officials were also disturbed when the Americans put the question of British flag 
shipping on the agenda for the Nixon. This had been a ‘serious issue’ in Anglo-American 
relations during the Johnson years when the Americans had insisted that the UK cease all trade 
with North Vietnam. With the UK economy in difficulty, trade was a vital question. However, 
while successfully limiting direct trade with North Vietnam from 1966, the Wilson government 
had less control over ships flying the British flag but operating under different national 
direction. In the event, Nixon would not make shipping an issue during his visit but it would 
remain a bone of contention between the two countries.56 
Nixon arrived in London on 24 February 1969 and told reporters on at Heathrow airport 
that ‘no two nations in the world more commonly and more closely share the means of 
communication than do the United States and the United Kingdom. We share a common 
language. We share the common law. We share great institutions of the Parliament. We share 
other institutions’.57 Speaking to the Cabinet, Stewart said the President’s outlook marked an 
‘excellent start’.58 Privately, when Nixon met Wilson, he thanked him for the ‘courage’ he had 
shown in backing the US on Vietnam in the face of domestic criticism including from within 
the parliamentary Labour party whose far-left was very anti-American.59 
The Vietnam phase of the Wilson-Nixon talks was dominated by the possibility of a 
North Vietnamese offensive against South Vietnam, with Hanoi perhaps seeking to strengthen 
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its negotiating position with battlefield success. The President assured the Prime Minister that 
he had no intention of resuming the bombing of North Vietnam, which Johnson had halted the 
year before, even though Wilson indicated support for such a measure in retaliation for DRV 
provocation. Once again, the contradiction in UK policy is apparent: on the one hand, as the 
upholder of the 1954 settlement, Britain ought not to have taken sides, in this case Wilson 
backing a resumption of Rolling Thunder, the sustained bombing of North Vietnam; on the 
other hand, the importance of close relations with the new US administration led to a policy of 
backing not challenging American policy.60   
On the face of it the Nixon visit provided public confirmation that the UK-US 
relationship remained close. But less than a month later Nixon told John Freeman, the British 
Ambassador to Washington, that henceforward references to the existence of the “special 
relationship” should be ‘played down’ in public to avoid damaging America’s relations with 
other key allies.61 As often in the post-1945 era, when the British sought an open declaration 
of specialness the most the Americans were prepared to offer was private closeness. On this 
occasion, Britain’s imminent bid to enter the EEC may have offered additional reason for 
American coolness. The UK’s first bid failed largely because the French saw British closeness 
to America as a means by which American influence would be brought into the heart of the 
European community. Keeping quiet about the “special relationship” may have been designed 
by Nixon to aid Britain’s prospects for EEC entry, which was a US objective.62 
Nixon claimed he wanted Anglo-American relations to remain intimate and he 
promised to ‘consult fully’ with the British in private on matters of international importance.63 
This, too, was not a new departure by a US President in dealing with a British Prime Minister. 
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Back in 1953, when Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House, he 
disappointed Winston Churchill by refusing to make any public declaration of the importance 
of US-UK relations to America’s foreign policy. Privately, Eisenhower said, there would be 
intimate consultation, and Churchill had to be content with that.64 As we will see, Eisenhower 
was mostly true to his promise but Nixon was not. In March 1969, the British were not informed 
in any way about the start of the US bombing – operation Menu – of Cambodia; but equally, 
the bombing was kept secret from all of America’s allies.65  
 
The Nixon administration toyed with several strategies for ending US involvement in the 
Vietnam war. Vietnamization, the staged withdrawal of US ground troops (and eventually air 
and naval forces) and their replacement with an expanded ARVN (Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam) paid for by America and provided with massive firepower, emerged as an early 
preference.66 Pacification (the holding of countryside won back from the communists) was also 
to be handed over to the South Vietnamese. At the international level, the Nixon administration 
hoped that its wider objective of détente would speed the Vietnam peace process. At the same 
time, the US wanted to be able to apply military pressure on North Vietnam through such 
operations as the bombing of Cambodia to increase America’s chances of gaining honourable 
peace terms in Paris.67 
Vietnamization gained momentum in the spring when Kissinger ordered the State 
Department and Pentagon to prepare a timetable for ‘Vietnamizing the war.68 At the same time, 
publicly, the administration stuck to its position of peace with honor which meant keeping up 
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the fight on both the battlefield and negotiating table.69 As the FCO noted, the purpose of the 
administration’s publicity at this time was to maintain ‘cautious optimism’ about the future and 
thus to keep anti-war protest neutralised in America.70 Vietnamization was part of this 
optimism push. In June, Nixon met South Vietnam’s President Thieu on Midway Island and 
announced an ‘immediate redeployment from Vietnam of a [US] division equivalent of 
approximately 25,000 men’. More US withdrawals would follow in keeping with the build-up 
of the ARVN.71 The following week, Nixon wrote to Wilson adding some detail. The British 
had not been consulted, or even asked for an opinion despite Nixon’s promise when he was in 
London at the start of the year. The UK had been told about a major US policy decision only 
after the decision had been concretized.72 This left Wilson with little choice other than to 
express ‘understanding and sympathy’ for America efforts to disentangle themselves from 
Vietnam.73 
Nixon and Wilson were next scheduled to meet in person in August when Nixon 
stopped over at RAF Mildenhall on the way home from a trip to Romania. Ahead of the 
meeting, Wilson was advised by Crawford Maclehose, British Ambassador to South Vietnam, 
to ‘just listen’ if the President referred to Vietnam, but if he felt the need to speak he should 
limit himself to a ‘word of encouragement’.74 Here, perhaps, is further proof of Britain’s 
diminished ability to influence US policy, not only in Vietnam but more generally too. It also 
confirms the contradiction in the UK position: an official promoter of peace thanks to the 
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legacy of 1954, it had become, as the FCO’s January review put it, an ‘instrument of American 
purpose’ making resistance to US war policy difficult.75 
When the two met, Wilson went beyond the advice given to him and assured Nixon of 
his full support in seeking an honourable exit from the war. The alternative – simply quitting 
Vietnam and seeing the communists win – risked losing all of Southeast Asia and a very 
damaging shift in the Cold War balance of power.76 In September, the FCO restated its backing 
for the Nixon administration’s search for a peace that helped contain communism in Southeast 
Asia, blamed the communists for the deadlock in Paris, and implied that if the US was ever 
forced to resume bombing of North Vietnam the responsibility would lay with Hanoi’s 
intransigence.77 
Meanwhile American assessments of the prospects for Vietnamization were upbeat. In 
September, Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense (who had come up with the word 
‘Vietnamization’ as an improvement on ‘de-Americanization’), drew Nixon’s attention to good 
progress as more and more American ground forces were brought home.78 On the US domestic 
front, Vietnamization was popular with many ordinary Americans even if anti-war activists 
criticised the policy as continuing the war just with less US deaths.79 To Laird, however, the 
key to continued public support was ongoing progress on Vietnamization, as point he made to 
Nixon.80 Soon after, Nixon announced that 60,000 US troops would be withdrawn by the end 
of the year (taking the 549,500 he had inherited down below the half-a-million mark) and 
further would follow in 1970.81 Kissinger had a concern, however. Rising public expectations 
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might force the administration to withdraw faster than the military situation safely allowed, 
thus handing over to the untested ARVN too soon. Vietnamization was like giving ‘salted 
peanuts’ to the public; the more troops withdrawn, the more they wanted.82  
 
By September, continuing anti-war activity in the United States, despite the launch of 
Vietnamization, disturbed Nixon.83 According to the UK Embassy in Washington, Nixon, 
fearful that domestic protest could damage his administration in the way it had Johnson’s, was 
giving ‘earnest’ thought to whether the US should re-focus most of its energy on seeking a 
speedy negotiated settlement by ending the Paris stalemate.84 Ambassador Freeman spoke to 
Kissinger. The President wanted a ‘diplomatic and propaganda campaign’ to put ‘moral 
pressure’ on the North Vietnamese to take a more positive attitude in Paris, Kissinger said. A 
UK contribution to this campaign would be an ‘important gesture of solidarity’. The FCO 
agreed that a signal of moral support would be well received by Nixon who was considered 
‘responsive to such gestures’. At the level of broad policy, Britain was already supporting US 
efforts to end the war and FCO policymakers now agreed that a ‘substantive’ show of support 
would be helpful to harmonious Anglo-American relations. According to Freeman, a 
declaration of UK faith in the administration’s approach, including a public statement that the 
US had gone ‘beyond expectations’ in trying to end the war, might even lessen domestic anti-
war criticism of Nixon.85 
The British effort was to be fronted by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary even 
though on past precedent it seemed bound to draw the anger of the DRV at the way that the 
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UK, in theory a neutral mediator due to Geneva 1954, was taking the American side.86 
However, a pro-US public relations exercise was considered all the more necessary by the FCO 
in view of the actions of a group of Labour MPs whose sympathies lay with the US anti-war 
movement. The day after the Vietnam Moratorium of 15 October 1969 – which witnessed mass 
anti-war gatherings not just in America but around the world – Labour dissenters tabled a 
motion in parliament echoing the demands of the US anti-war movement and calling on the 
government to break with the Nixon administration if there was no peace by the end of the 
year. Despite this, the Wilson government remained publicly steadfast in support of the United 
States and declared its confidence that the President would see the war through to a satisfactory 
conclusion.87  
What the British did not know – nor anyone beyond a handful of key individuals in the 
Nixon-Kissinger inner circle – was that Kissinger had recently begun top secret meetings in 
Paris with DRV figures, most notably Politburo members Xuan Thy and Le Duc Tho, outside 
of the formal public peace process in the hope that out of the glare of the media some serious 
diplomacy would be possible. In the event, this parallel “back-channel” US-DRV peace process 
would prove to be as ineffective as the public process for more than two years.88 
 
By November Nixon was feeling ‘besieged’ by domestic critics.89 Once again, the US 
administration expressed a desire for a statement of support from its closest ally, Britain. Nixon 
was due to deliver a major televised address on Vietnam and the State Department asked the 
FCO to persuade the Prime Minister to make a statement backing the President. Wilson, 
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however, refused to endorse Nixon’s statement without knowing its contents. It is a measure of 
how much the Americans needed international backing that Kissinger swiftly provided Wilson 
with a summary.90 Wilson, satisfied, went on to express publicly his admiration for Nixon’s 
‘determination to seek an honourable conclusion’ to the war – but he waited a week before 
doing so.91  
In his own address, Nixon spoke directly to what he called ‘the great silent majority of 
my fellow Americans’, those who had not joined the anti-war movement and though worried 
about Vietnam were loyally supporting the President. Nixon reminded his audience that he was 
determined ‘to end the war in a way that we could win the peace’. With Vietnamization, ‘I have 
initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have 
from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed’. In the previous 
Democratic administration, ‘we Americanized the war’ but in his administration ‘we are 
Vietnamizing the search for peace’. He ended by declaring that ‘North Vietnam cannot defeat 
or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that’.92 
The UK government used America’s need for British support at this juncture to press 
an idea on Washington. The time had come, policymakers felt, for a new approach on Vietnam, 
with the UK working with the USSR to persuade Hanoi to take the peace process seriously.93 
The Nixon administration appeared to agree. At any rate, the Wilson government was praised 
for its constructive approach, and Wilson thanked for his supportive statement. Was this an 
example of constructive Anglo-American policymaking in action? Possibly but only up to a 
point as Nixon insisted that any UK approach to Hanoi, with or without Moscow’s assent, be 
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undertaken as a ‘general endorsement’ of the correctness of American policy and a reproach to 
the North Vietnamese.94  
This explicitly pro-US approach was not what the FCO had in mind. Historian John 
Young has argued that after the Tet Offensive of 1968, Wilson did not face any ‘serious 
difficulty’ over Vietnam until April 1970.95 This would not appear to be the case. Throughout 
the latter half of 1969, the British government found itself in an increasingly difficult situation. 
On the one hand, it sought to back US Vietnam policy to buttress all-round Anglo-American 
relations; on the other hand, it sought to be loyal to its 1954 Geneva obligations. It was a tricky 
balancing act. Closeness to America brought criticism from within the parliamentary Labour 
party and sections of popular opinion while an overly assertive approach to upholding the 1954 
settlement risked antagonising the Americans. The FCO eventually agreed on an initial 
cautious sounding-out of the USSR via a personal message from the Prime Minister to his 
counterpart in Moscow, Alexei Kosygin. The message was delivered to the Kremlin on 14 
November. It was received coldly. Expressing his disappointment that America’s primary 
interest was not peace but a continuation of the war with ‘Vietnamese fighting Vietnamese’, 
Kosygin said he would provide a detailed response in due course.96  
As November  came to a close, Freeman returned to London to meet with Wilson and 
discuss ‘the state of feeling’ in the US before the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington, which 
was scheduled for early 1970. According to Freeman, the Americans ‘much appreciated’ UK 
support on Vietnam and hoped it would continue. This was useful for the Wilson government 
to know especially as it was likely that Nixon would win a second term and the Republicans 
be in power for another seven years.97 Freeman’s main US source of information was the US 
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Secretary of State William Rogers, supposedly a ‘close confidant’ of the President. We now 
know that Rogers was not appointed by Nixon for his competence. As Karnow notes, it was in 
fact Rogers’ ‘unfamiliarity’ with international affairs that got him the job in that this guaranteed 
that key foreign policy making would be dominated by the White House. The State 
Department, the main UK source of information on Vietnam, was side-lined.98 
Kosygin replied formally to Wilson’s letter on 3 December. Acknowledging UK 
concern over the stalemate situation in Paris, the Soviet leader ‘could not fail to notice’ that the 
UK had not changed its policy towards American intervention in Vietnam. Kosygin suggested 
that if, as Wilson argued, ‘all should seek to contribute to a negotiated political settlement’, the 
UK should take a more ‘realistic’ stance. In other words, Britain should put its ‘moral 
obligations’ as Geneva co-chair ahead of the “special relationship”. Until it did that, 
multilateral action between the 1954 co-chairs would not be possible.99 
A few days later, to Nixon’s ‘personal appreciation’, Wilson again prioritised Anglo-
American relations by openly defending US policy and reiterating Britain’s support for Nixon’s 
‘determination to seek an honourable negotiated settlement’.100 As we know, Nixon’s “peace 
with honor” meant, in its most basic form, an end to the war on terms favourable to the United 
States. But was peace on these terms in keeping with the legacy of 1954? This issue, raised in 
1969, would continue to complicate UK policy and Anglo-American relations in 1970. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
UK Indochina policy: from Labour to Conservative, 1970 
 
 
By the start of 1970 over 100,000 American troops had been withdrawn as part of the 
Vietnamization prowess while the ARVN had been expanded. In Paris, however, the peace 
negotiations, which paralleled the ongoing war in South Vietnam, were bogged down. When 
Lodge resigned as leader of the US delegation in Paris in December 1969, Nixon, in a show of 
frustration, delayed replacing him for several months.101  
Writing in the New York Times, James Reston concluded that ‘Nixon had dealt more 
effectively with the politics of his problems than with the problems themselves’ in his first year 
in office. In other words, Nixon handled Vietnam by using what today we would call “spin”, 
but he was a long way from solving the problem.102 In Washington, the British Embassy felt 
that Reston ‘underestimated’ the importance of the politics of Vietnam. Previous Presidents 
had used Vietnam as the ‘starting point’ of their administration’s policy, attempting to ‘drag’ 
public opinion along. Nixon had ‘reversed the formula’ to focus on the greater crisis, the 
‘strain’ imposed on ‘American institutions’, thereby shaping Vietnam policy on public opinion. 
The Embassy thought this a clever approach. Domestic opposition, ‘all but intolerable’ in the 
late-LBJ period, had turned into something ‘much less than a total obsession’.103 In London, 
this report was regarded as useful by FCO planners preparing for the Prime Minister’s visit to 
Washington.104 
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The general outlook for the Nixon-Wilson talks was reasonably promising. The more 
the two leaders could meet to ‘talk, know and understand one another’ the better, Freeman 
argued.105 Nixon appeared to share this view. The FCO Planning Staff thought that the 
President was ‘very well disposed towards Britain’ and considered that his administration 
enjoyed ‘more intimate relations with Britain than with any other foreign country’. The primary 
objective of the Wilson visit should be to strengthen the ‘present relations of trust and intimacy’ 
and ‘make the fullest use of the President’s goodwill’.106 Across the Atlantic, Kissinger 
maintained that the ‘special relationship’ was evidenced by the number and range of US-UK 
contacts and by the ‘broad consensus shared on substance’ which these demonstrated.107 
British optimism diminished when, just a week before Wilson’s Washington visit, the 
US authorities ‘urgently’ raised the question of British flag shipping. The Vergmont, a 
‘genuinely British’ ship, was reported to be on its way to Haiphong, the DRV’s main port. The 
Americans wanted the ship stopped en route. The ‘estimated arrival date’, Foreign Secretary 
Michael Stewart conceded, ‘is very unfortunate’. Communist propaganda about the Vergmont 
might arouse criticism in America. However, there was a limit to how far the government could 
impede the freedom of British commerce and Stewart advised Wilson that ‘some reactions 
from Congress and others in the United States’ was to be expected.108 In the event, the 
Vergmont avoided Haiphong, but as the Times editorialized, the Vietnam war ‘remains…the 
biggest source of poison in international relations’ and, by extension, Anglo-American 
relations.109 
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Wilson received a warm reception on arrival in the United States on 27 January. Nixon greeted 
him as an ‘old friend…not only in government’ but ‘personally’. A ‘great deal is possible’ 
when the UK and US were ‘together’, he added.110 Wilson, for his part, called the visit ‘by far 
the best…I have had’ to America.111 Back in London on 5 February, he told Cabinet colleagues 
that American policymakers ‘clearly set considerable store by the advice and information 
which British Ministers and British diplomatic representatives abroad could give them’. More 
specifically, he had been ‘impressed and reassured’ by Nixon's ‘determination to persist in his 
policy of Vietnamisation’.112 Some Cabinet ministers thought that Wilson exaggerated how 
well he got on with the President, and when Labour lost the June 1970 General Election and 
Edward Heath and the Conservatives took office, Nixon was reportedly ‘pleased’.113 
Be that as it may, the Nixon-Wilson summit covered the full field of international 
relations.114 When the talks focused on Vietnam, Wilson was pleased to learn that US 
assessments were hopeful. Aside from Vietnamization, US troop withdrawals and the resulting 
downturn in American casualties, ‘the biggest blow we have struck’, the President said, ‘is the 
muting of American dissent’. In other words the quieting down of the previously vociferous 
anti-war movement.115 Later, the Times sounded a note of caution which Wilson might have 
heeded. With regard to Vietnamization, ‘success…is not nearly so assured as most people 
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appear to assume. The possibility of failure is very real…North Vietnam will not negotiate if 
the Vietnamization policy is a success, and there will be no need for negotiations if it fails’.116  
In the Paris peace process, the chances of a breakthrough remained remote entering 
1970. ‘Traditionally’, historian Yoshihiko Mizumoto writes, British Prime Ministers had been 
‘crucial…in opening negotiations with the communists’. Examples of the UK taking the lead 
in Cold War diplomacy went back to Attlee and Bevin in the late 1940s and Churchill and Eden 
in the 1950s. Now, in 1970, Wilson ‘attached great significance to the Anglo-Soviet…co-
chairmanship of the Geneva conference of 1954’ and this offered the prospect of a UK part in 
forwarding the negotiations.117  
The problem for the British, to judge from Wilson’s insights gained in Washington, 
was that the Americans did not seem to want their help. ‘We are not approaching the Russians 
on Vietnam’, Nixon told Wilson. ‘To do so is an exercise in futility. They can’t afford to appear 
not to support Hanoi’. On Vietnam, ‘our best position is to accept Russian help, but not to ask 
for it. They won’t help us because we ask them; they will help us because they will face the 
necessity’. This last remark hinted at linkage. If the Soviets wanted a Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty (SALT, one of Nixon’s top goals as he sought to develop détente), they might have to 
give the United States something in return, possibly leaning on North Vietnam to be more 
constructive in Paris. While the Americans waited for the Soviets, one of the 1954 Geneva co-
chairs, to come round, there was still an opportunity for the other chair, the UK, to be proactive. 
This seems to be the conclusion Wilson drew.118 But was it a real or an imagined opportunity? 
Martin Luther King Jr. once remarked of Nixon that up close ‘he almost disarms you with his 
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apparent sincerity’.119 Had Wilson been duped? Time would tell whether there was substance 
to the “special relationship” under Nixon. On the face of it, though, all was well as the President 
publicly toasted the ‘personal friendship’ between himself and Wilson.120  
 
The most dramatic development in Indochina in 1970 came not in Vietnam but in Cambodia. 
In March, Norodom Sihanouk, the neutralist Cambodian leader, was overthrown in a coup 
d'état by Army General Lon Nol.121 Following the coup, the new government abandoned 
Cambodia’s previous neutrality and called on the United States for assistance in eliminating 
the North Vietnamese military presence which had built up inside its territory in the 
borderlands close to South Vietnam and had been hitherto tolerated by Sihanouk.122 In 
Washington, Lon Nol’s accession was welcomed by the Nixon administration. Hitherto, 
because of Cambodia’s neutrality, US operations in the country in connection with the war in 
Vietnam had been ultra-secret (operation Menu, for example). Now Nixon prepared for open 
American intervention.123 ‘If Cambodia becomes a Communist base, Vietnamization becomes 
impossible’, he insisted. A ‘bold move’ was needed to boost the country’s security.124  
As the Cambodian situation developed, the British weighed their obligations under the 
1954 Geneva agreement. According to a FCO position paper, the UK was supportive of 
American policy in Vietnam but ‘anxious’ that the problems in Cambodia, and Laos, be ring-
fenced from Vietnam and ‘resolved peacefully’. The British should therefore seek to use their 
influence as co-chair of the Geneva conference to effect a peaceful resolution, to that end, seek 
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to work with the USSR, the other guardian of the 1954 agreement.125 The Americans, however, 
were not interested. On 30 April, Nixon announced that US forces had entered Cambodia at 
the request of the Lon Nol government. He justified the move on the grounds that clearing 
North Vietnamese sanctuaries would prevent the DRV using Cambodia as a springboard for a 
major attack on South Vietnam and so protect the timetable for US troop withdrawals and 
Vietnamization.126  
This made military logic to the Nixon, but the antiwar movement in the United States 
was outraged. Here was a President who had pledged to end the war in Vietnam escalating it 
into another country. In consequence, Nixon’s announcement triggered a ‘rush of protest’ 
which took a tragic turn at Kent State university, Ohio, and Jackson State university in 
Mississippi, when National Guard units fired on protesters, killing six young people.127 At the 
same time, opinion polls indicated significant retained support for Nixon amongst the “silent 
majority” of conservative Americans. The US Congress, however, was outraged by what it saw 
as an abuse of the President’s authority both as Commander-in-Chief and under the 1964 Gulf 
of Tonkin resolution. Consequently, Congress revoked the resolution and ordered Nixon to 
cease the Cambodian intervention by 1 June regardless of whether its objectives had been 
achieved. Congress also legislated against any Presidential deployment of US ground troops in 
operations in Southeast Asia beyond South Vietnam, although in specifying ground troops 
rather than military action in all forms Congress inadvertently permitted the secret bombing of 
Cambodia to continue for a time.128 
In London, the FCO watched events closely. The Cambodian crisis posed a dilemma. 
On the one hand, UK support for the US administration would strengthen Nixon’s standing at 
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home and be appreciated by the White House. On the other hand, public support for Nixon on 
Cambodia would be supporting a policy that many people in Britain and Western Europe, never 
mind America, considered to be ‘manifestly wrong’. Equally, a UK failure to back the United 
States in this moment of need, if it was matched by other US allies, would encourage North 
Vietnam to fight harder for military victory and therefore damage the chances of negotiated 
settlement which was the UK goal. Finally, UK disassociation from the US was bound to have 
‘profound consequences’ on Anglo-American relations across the spectrum.129  
In Washington, Nixon was desperate for international support. At one point, he 
instructed Kissinger to call in ‘some of the lily-livered Ambassadors from our so-called friends 
in the world’, and included the British Ambassador in this category. ‘We are going to find out 
who our friends are now, because if we decide to stand up here some of the rest of them had 
better come along fast’.130 On 30 April, the day the US invasion was announced, the British 
Cabinet met. US forces had crossed into Cambodia with the object of destroying North 
Vietnamese bases, Stewart explained, but it was unclear whether the American move was a 
‘once-for-all operation or whether it would continue’. The UK government needed to work out 
its position and Stewart’s view was that ‘categorical statements’ in support or opposition to US 
policy ‘should be avoided’. There was no question of open disassociation, he told ministers, 
but ‘we should be equally careful not to endorse the action they had taken, especially in view 
of our position as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference’. Stewart recommended – and the 
Cabinet agreed – that any public statement be limited to stressing that events demonstrated ‘the 
importance of a political settlement’. Britain could play a diplomatic role by working for the 
reconvening of Geneva Conference as a forum for working out a settlement for all Indochina.131  
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However, when the government’s fence-sitting was made public, Labour left-winger 
Michael Foot was outraged and demanded that parliament give ‘urgent consideration’ to the 
need for ‘immediate…diplomatic action, including strong protests’ against the US invasion. 
Sufficient MPs agreed with Foot for a full-scale debate to be scheduled for 5 May.132 
On the morning of the debate, the Cabinet met again. Stewart reported that the Soviet 
government was unwilling to work with the UK in a joint bid to reconvene the Geneva 
conference. Looking ahead to the debate, there were two aspects to consider. The first was a 
call by the Labour left for diplomatic action to ease the situation; this could and was being 
supported, said Stewart. The second was Foot’s insistence that the government publicly 
condemn the actions of the Nixon administration. Clearly, Stewart said, it was not possible to 
criticise the Americans in this way and he proposed to tell parliament that the areas in which 
the US was operating had been occupied by the North Vietnamese and that there was some 
legitimacy in cleansing these zones of communist influence.133 
 In discussion, the Cabinet weighed the implications for Anglo-American relations. The 
Americans ‘were our allies’, it was pointed out, and ‘we had an overriding interest in the 
maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance and of a United States presence in Europe’. But what 
would happen if the government did as Foot wanted and condemned the Americans? In 
answering this question, Cabinet ministers expressed a fear that had haunted all British 
governments since the end of the Second World War, namely that speaking out risked 
‘provoking a reaction in the United States in favour of isolationism, which would be very 
damaging to our interests in the longer term’.134 
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In the end, the Foreign Secretary undertook to remind parliament that the government 
had consistently argued that a military solution of the Vietnam war was not possible and had 
already taken several diplomatic initiatives to help bring about a negotiated peace. But it was 
important not to let the communists off the hook. Despite the Nixon administration’s troop 
withdrawals, there had been ‘no corresponding response by the Government of North Vietnam 
and the other Communist elements in South-East Asia, either at the conference table in Paris 
or in the war theatre in Vietnam’. Apart from this, Stewart saw no reason to explain or justify 
the United States incursion and, as already agreed, he would avoid expressing either approval 
or condemnation. As the Cabinet drew to an end the Prime Minster said that he would close 
the debate in parliament and ‘stress the deep apprehension which was felt, not only in this 
country but throughout the world, about recent developments in Indo-China, which had 
potential implications extending far beyond South-East Asia itself’. As to the Cambodian crisis, 
Wilson agreed that ‘our attitude should be one of detachment’ and ‘in this spirit he would 
propose to refer to the possibility of our promoting action by the United Nations, to our position 
as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference and to our determination to play an active role in 
continuing to seek a negotiated solution through these or any other appropriate channels’.135 
In the debate, Stewart said that America could not be ‘absolutely bound’ by a neutrality 
which had ‘ceased to have real effect’ in Cambodia. When he refused to condemn the US 
invasion, however, he was heckled by some MPs from his own backbenches. ‘It seems to me 
that the task of this country is to assert and to continue the work for a policy of an agreed and 
negotiated solution,’ he retorted. When Wilson spoke, it was to express the hope that 
Washington would not reverse its withdrawal plans and Vietnamisation. But he too avoided 
specific criticism of US intervention.136 
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Afterwards, Nixon thanked Wilson and Stewart for their support (although a close 
reading of what they said in parliament showed equivocation not backing).137 The Times was 
more accurate in referring to the government’s ‘qualified’ and ‘muted’ support for Nixon’s 
policy.138 If the government’s balancing act satisfied the White House, it did not placate the 
Labour left, and while the government survived the division (with a 278-68 vote in its favour), 
a significant number of Labour MPs lodged protest votes.139 In retrospect, Wilson’s vague 
position (neither backing nor condemning US actions) was possibly related to the UK domestic 
political situation. Two weeks later he called a General Election with the poll set for 18 June. 
With the prospect of an election in mind, it made political sense for Wilson to adopt a middle-
of-the-road position rather than risk alienating sections of the electorate by adopting an 
explicitly a pro- or anti-American stance.140 
From a military standpoint, the results of the Cambodian operation were mixed. On the 
plus side, communist supply lines were disrupted and the Lon Nol regime helped to stay in 
power. Against this, the invasion prompted a resurgence of anti-war protests in America and 
led to Congressional criticism and curbs.141 In the UK, when the Congressional deadline for 
American withdrawal from Cambodia arrived in June, Wilson’s time as Prime Minister was 
almost up. In the event, it was Edward Heath and the Conservatives who triumphed in the 
election.142 Nixon seems to have been pleased by this outcome. Despite frequent statements of 
the close personal bond he shared with Wilson, Nixon found Heath more congenial politically. 
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‘There was no foreign leader for whom Nixon had a higher regard’, recalled Kissinger.143 The 
Anglo-American partnership thus appeared strengthened as a result of the British election. 
However, as time would show, in many respects Heath was ‘deeply sceptical about Britain’s 
obsession with America’.144  
What of Vietnam? What was Labour’s legacy to the Tories? The Cambodian episode 
presented Wilson with the most ‘serious difficulty’ he had faced on Indochina for some years 
and exposed (so his critics argued) the limits of his government’s commitment to peace.145 The 
dilemmas that Indochina posed for Wilson were not purely party-political, however, as Heath 
would discover. Could or should the UK adopt a policy of total commitment to Geneva 1954 
and place itself centre-stage with the USSR as peace-maker? If so, could the UK adopt that role 
without damaging Anglo-American relations? As Craig Wilson has shown, the Labour leader’s 
‘major difficulty’ was that he ‘attempted to attain mutually incompatible goals’, namely to 
‘maintain the special relationship’ whilst simultaneously ‘pressing Washington to stop the 
war’.146  
 
Heath and the Conservatives would also struggle in this regard, but despite Heath’s reputation 
for coolness about the “special relationship”, his default position, as we will see, was to support 
America on Vietnam.  
Back in May 1969, Heath had been invited to the White House for talks (treatment 
Nixon usually reserved for heads of government, not leaders of the opposition). The ‘special 
relationship’, Heath told his hosts, ‘was no artificial relationship to be created or abandoned at 
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will’. This was welcome news to the United States administration at a time when Britain’s 
value as an ally was in doubt in Washington.147 The Labour government’s earlier withdrawal 
from “East of Suez”, giving up a network of military bases, was seen as a ‘serious abdication 
of responsibilities’ at a time when America needed a strong ally in Southeast Asia. The 
formation of a Conservative government was thus broadly welcomed by US policymakers in 
offering a new start for Anglo-American relations.148 
In mid-1970, Kissinger concluded a study of the impact the change of government in 
Britain would have on US foreign policy. Overall, it was likely to have ‘generally favourable 
implications’ with Britain probably adopting ‘a more active and positive role’ in international 
policy. Specifically, ‘the Heath Government will probably offer more support for our Vietnam 
policies’. The Nixon administration looked forward to a ‘highly constructive and congenial 
relationship…at every level’.149 According to Kissinger, Nixon ‘wanted nothing so much’ with 
Heath ‘as an intimate collaboration of a kind he would not grant to any other foreign leader’.150 
The morning after the UK election, Nixon telephoned Heath to tell him he ‘would be a great 
improvement on the previous government’. He also wanted him to visit Washington as soon as 
possible.151 The next month Nixon wrote to ‘Ted’ to share the ‘final report’ of the Cambodian 
operation.152 Heath in turn assured the President of his ‘fullest support’ in the search for peace 
and expressed admiration for the ‘firmness and persistence’ Nixon had shown on Vietnam.153 
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During the summer, turmoil in the Middle East deflected Nixon’s attention from 
Vietnam for a time. Nevertheless, ARVN operations continued in Cambodia (without direct 
US assistance) while military aid to Lon Nol increased.154 In July, Ambassador Freeman 
returned to London from Washington to brief the new government on the ‘American scene’. 
Nixon had been taking a ‘more detached’ attitude to South-East Asia generally, Freeman felt, 
while in Vietnam the ‘basic decisions’ had been made that were expected to lead to an 
‘honourable settlement’. The Cambodian crisis had not altered this. An armistice was a matter 
of time, and the Americans were content to wait.155  
In the Paris peace process, Nixon had finally got around to replacing Lodge as Head of 
the US delegation with David Bruce, a diplomat highly respected in Britain where he had been 
Ambassador.156 Nixon was confident that a breakthrough would come sooner rather than later. 
In a news conference at the end of July he declared that ‘the prospects for a negotiated peace 
should be better now than they were before…as a result of our Cambodian operation…the 
enemy position is weaker than it was before’.157 
Three months later, on 7 October, Nixon announced a ‘major new initiative for peace’. 
The ‘culmination of a Government-wide effort…on the negotiation front’, made possible by 
the ‘remarkable success’ of Vietnamization, the initiative consisted of five linked proposals to 
‘open the door’ to an ‘enduring peace’: an Indochina-wide ceasefire; an international peace 
conference modelled on Geneva 1954; the withdrawal of all US and North Vietnamese forces 
from South Vietnam; a DRV commitment to a political settlement guaranteeing the right of 
self-determination to the people of South Vietnam; and the ‘immediate and unconditional’ 
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release of all POW’s.158 In London, the Conservative government praised a ‘comprehensive 
up-dating’ of the US position which seemed likely to be well received by the US public. The 
only ‘disappointment’, Freeman noted, was the failure to announce ‘accelerated troop 
withdrawals’.159 A few days later, Nixon rectified this by ordering the Pentagon ‘to reduce the 
authorized ceiling of our forces in Vietnam by another 40,000 between now and Christmas’. 
As a result, ‘there will be…205,500 fewer Americans in Vietnam by Christmas of this year 
than when I took office’.160 
As a possible pointer to the kind of relationship Nixon sought to develop with Heath, 
an advance copy of his five-point statement had been passed to London by Kissinger with a 
plea that positive support would be ‘greatly appreciated’.161 The Americans perhaps had 
learned how to handle Prime Ministers based on the problems experienced with Wilson the 
previous year. At any rate, it had an effect. On 8 October, the government publicly welcomed 
Nixon’s proposals and expressed the hope that ‘positive progress’ could be made in the peace 
process.162 In addition, the new Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, called on the Soviet 
Union, as co-chair of Geneva 1954, to ‘seize the opportunity’ to support the negotiations.163 
Unfortunately, despite what the Foreign Office described as a ‘fair and reasonable’ request, the 
USSR refused to comply.164 By the time the Cabinet discussed Vietnam on 15 October, the 
North Vietnamese had also rejected both the UK proposal for a revived Geneva conference and 
Nixon’s five-point plan.165 
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In autumn 1970, Nixon visited Britain. On 3 October, he and Heath consulted together at 
Chequers in an atmosphere which the Prime Minister described as ‘very cordial’.166 FCO briefs 
drawn up ahead of the Nixon visit suggested that the establishment of a strong US-UK 
relationship was a top Nixon objective. It was hoped that Nixon’s already evidenced respect 
for Heath could be built upon – without using the ‘old-fashioned concept’ of the “Special 
Relationship” – to indicate that Britain stands ‘closer to the United States than other countries 
do and are entitled to be treated with the confidence that this demands’.167  
To judge from what Heath reported to the Cabinet, these predictions were merited. Nixon 
had ‘clearly wished to establish a close relationship’ and had discussed policies with ‘complete 
freedom and frankness’. On Vietnam he reaffirmed that troop withdrawals, Vietnamization and 
the peace process were the main planks of his policy.168 According to the US record, Nixon 
was frank on the kind of interaction he wanted with Heath: 
 
If anything comes up, please call…We will keep things in confidence…The need 
for communication has never been greater. We will continue to face major 
problems in the Middle East. SALT is quite undetermined. Tell us where you 
disagree. We will feel free to ask your advice. We do not want to be the only 
country making foreign policy. We want your participation east of Suez so that we 
are not the only non-Asian power present there. The same is true in East-West 
relations. We will feel free about your relations with the Soviets, and we will keep 
you informed about ours.169 
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Whether this would be the case in practice remained to be seen. On the UK side, Heath wanted 
to restore the harmony of UK-US relations which he felt had been disturbed under Labour. He 
was also prepared to back US policy in Indochina for Cold War geo-strategic reasons, namely 
to prevent the spread of communism across Southeast Asia, even though this was not a 
domestically popular positon. The Nixon administration had picked up on all this. The “special 
relationship” not only existed, Kissinger said, but ‘continued to flow strong’.170 However, 
Kissinger’s assessment would soon be put to the test. 
Anglo-American leaders met again in December when Nixon had the ‘special privilege’ 
of welcoming Heath to the White House for the first time as Prime Minister. As he had done 
on Wilson’s arrival ten months previously, Nixon emphasised the importance of the US-UK 
relationship.171 Heath, however, a committed Europhile keen to do nothing to damage the UK 
chances of entering the EEC after previous failed bids, ‘went into extraordinary verbal 
gymnastics to avoid using the phrase Special Relationship’ in case it antagonised the French 
and other Western Europeans.172 Instead he spoke of a ‘natural relationship’.173 Heath later 
maintained that the term ‘special relationship’ was a flimsy construction that that could be 
‘broken at a moment’s notice’ whereas ‘natural relationship’ reflected the shared culture which 
had made relations so free-flowing up to this point.174  
Nixon seemed unfazed by the terminology and wrote to Heath a little later expressing 
his hope for a ‘further strengthening the natural relationship’.175 In contrast, Kissinger was 
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irritated. The ‘special relationship’ was evidently ‘an obstacle to the British vocation in 
Europe’, he complained.176 The Washington visit had come at a delicate point in the entry 
negotiations. A year earlier, the FCO Planning Staff had warned that for many Europeans the 
UK’s closeness to the US remained a ‘Trojan horse’ (to let Britain enter the community would 
be to let the Americans in by default).177 Heath understood this and was ready - as Kissinger 
had not failed to notice - to ‘underscore the special relationship, but delicately so not to 
stimulate French fears, which could provoke a third veto of EEC membership’.178  
Although the EEC took up a lot of time in the Nixon-Heath talks Vietnam also featured. 
Despite his election promise of “peace with honor”, Nixon no longer seemed to mind how the 
war was terminated. ‘We are hastening the end of the war and since we are ending it anyway, 
it doesn’t make any difference to us whether it comes about unilaterally or through 
negotiations,’ he told Heath. ‘The only incentive we have left for negotiations is the prisoners.’ 
Nixon was equally frank in replying to Heath’s question: ‘Will you be prepared to see 
Cambodia go down the drain?’: 
 
The President said, “In effect, yes.” The Prime Minister asked, “Is there a domino 
theory?” The President then said, “If the United States leaves Vietnam in a way 
that the U.S. interprets as a failure, we will then have to get out of Asia. The 
Japanese are then going to switch and confidence in us will erode. This is why we 
will see it through. If there should be any change in our views, we will warn Britain 
ahead of time, and we will also warn Britain of any major actions we will take”.179  
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This was hardly a vote of confidence in the peace process. Heath, however, instead of taking 
the President to task, as befitted the heir of Geneva 1954, remained silent.180 On his return to 
London, Heath told the Cabinet that the Nixon administration was ‘strongly in favour’ of 
European integration, and of UK EEC entry. On Vietnam, Heath merely noted the 
‘considerable optimism’ of US policymakers about Vietnamization.181  
 
In the space of a few months, Anglo-American relations appeared to have undergone an 
improvement under the Conservatives. The New York Daily News declared that the Prime 
Minister’s visit was ‘the first time since the Eisenhower Administration that genuine personal 
friendliness has been enjoyed by the political leaders of the two nations’.182 
 As for the Indochinese situation as 1970 came to a close, despite the US misadventure 
in Cambodia, Nixon still hoped to fulfil his electoral pledge to end the war by the time he was 
due for re-election. By the same token failure to deliver on his 1968 “promise” could risk his 
chances of a second term.183 Doubts remained about the quality of the ARVN. After two years 
of US investment, Vietnamization had transformed the ARVN into one of the largest and best-
equipped militaries in the world but armies fight on battlefields not paper. Plagued by 
‘corruption, desertion, and poor leadership’, any success the ARVN had so far achieved was 
attributable to Hanoi’s deliberate decision to go on the defensive in South Vietnam in the 
aftermath of the Tet disaster of 1968 and await US withdrawals.184 There were some signs of 
progress. With the communists on the defensive, pacification made some forward strides, 
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particularly in the Mekong delta. Yet pacification often relied on ‘torture, assassination, and 
forced relocation’, methods not best designed to achieve the US-RVN desire to ‘expand and 
improve’ security while winning ‘the support and allegiance’ of increasing numbers of the local 
population. Indeed, the FCO suspected that pacification created rural resentment and thus made 
a recruitment reservoir for the communists.185  
In public, the Nixon administration remained positive and entered 1971 insisting that 
Vietnamization was on track. On 6 January, the US Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, 
declared that progress was ‘ahead of schedule’, the ARVN was poised to ‘take over the military 
burdens’, and the primary combat role of US ground forces all but over.186 Laird said much the 
same to the UK Embassy during a visit to Saigon. The situation was ‘heartening’ and he was 
‘much encouraged’.187 In London, in contrast, the FCO was dubious about the prospects for 
Vietnamisation and feared that the largely conscript ARVN would never be a match for the 
highly-motivated, well-armed, skilful and conviction-driven troops of the North Vietnamese 
army.188  
British misgiving were echoed by Richard Teare, a member of the National Security 
Council Working Group (NSCWG) on Vietnam, who was much franker than Laird in talking 
to British Embassy officials in Washington. Teare confided that while South Vietnamese 
morale had improved lately he had ‘no idea’ what would happen when there was ‘no longer 
enough US technicians to keep the air conditioning going in the [ARVN] generals’ trailers’. 
He was not being facetious. South Vietnamese reliance on the US for air-conditioning was 
emblematic of South Vietnamese reliance on the Americans in all other ways especially 
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militarily. The rate of US troop withdrawals in 1971 had to be carefully weighed, Teare further 
confided. Obviously the sooner the “boys” were home the more content US public opinion 
would become. But too hasty a retreat and the RVN might collapse as soon as the last US 
solider departed. Teare indicated that the administration’s undisclosed objective was to see 
troop levels fall below 100,000 by the time of the November 1972 US election. An increased 
rate of withdrawal was reportedly on the cards to aid Nixon’s re-election but ‘important voices’ 
within the administration had strong reservations.189  
One of those voices was Kissinger’s. In his memoirs, Kissinger explained that the rate 
of the ground force draw-down worried him. ‘[S]udden withdrawal, even if it did not wreck 
the South Vietnamese government and the prospects of Vietnamization, would convey…a 
sense of impatience to Hanoi’. If the DRV was given any indication that the US were looking 
to cut and run, there would be no hope of getting North Vietnam to negotiate seriously in the 
Paris peace process, the latter being one of the administration’s routes to “peace with honor”. 
On the contrary, it would strengthen Hanoi’s resolve to wait out the American withdrawal, with 
air and naval power presumed to follow ground forces back to the US, before seeking full 
military victory.190  
On the subject of the peace talks, Teare questioned the sincerity of Nixon’s October 
1970 five-point proposal.191 In later years, Kissinger admitted that the initiative had a dual 
purpose: to ‘get the negotiations off dead center’ and get the administration’s ‘critics off the 
front pages’.192 According to Teare, it was the latter aim that was paramount. No-one in the 
administration expected a positive response from Hanoi, nor was there one, but Nixon gained 
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good PR.193 Similarly, William Safire described Nixon’s five-point programme as 
‘grandstanding’ and ‘showboating’ for domestic political gain by appearing to show Congress 
and the media that he was committed to the peace process.194  
The FCO valued the candid insights Teare provided. Although in general terms Anglo-
American relations had improved over the previous year, the FCO was worried about the 
quality of the Vietnam-related information it was receiving from the State Department. In this 
connection, Teare’s account differed – and indeed contradicted – insights previously shared 
with the British by officials at the State Department, and his assessment of Vietnamization was 
markedly less optimistic. And where the State Department insisted that Nixon’s five-points 
were a  ‘serious invitation’ to Hanoi to get negotiations going, Teare maintained that Nixon 
was just playing a domestic political game.195  
The Heath government knew that Nixon and Kissinger were the makers of the key 
features of US foreign policy with the State Department marginalised. In autumn 1970, the 
Cabinet bemoaned the ‘confused relationship’ between the White House and State Department. 
‘Though both the President and Secretary of State appeared willing and anxious to maintain 
close and friendly relations with us, the latter was often not consulted’. Indeed, Douglas-Home 
observed, there had been times recently when ‘the White House had asked us…not to inform 
the State Department of discussions we had had with them’.196  
The British Embassy in Washington did its best to foster close relations with Kissinger 
and his staff but was handicapped by the fact that the State Department was its default source 
of day-to-day information on Vietnam. The FCO thus found itself in an ‘uncomfortable’ 
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position; it wished to maintain good relations with the State Department but Kissinger’s 
empire-building made it a dubious provider of information; by the same token, maintaining 
close relations with the White House depended on hiding from the State Department the 
existence (never mind the substance) of the UK Embassy’s backchannel conversations with 
Kissinger.197  
For the British, the mechanics of US foreign policy-making in general and decision-
making on Vietnam in particular was an ongoing source of concern. The partnership between 
the President and his National Security Advisor was recognised as the key factor – in fact some 
historians have coined the term ‘Nixingerism’ to reflect their shared outlook.198 At the time, 
however, Freeman felt that Nixon was ‘too intimate’ with Kissinger and ‘too personally 
dependent upon him for the good of the system’. Kissinger’s personality created further 
problems. ‘He is naturally a bad administrator and his vanity is nourished by the presidential 
intimacy’, Freeman informed the FCO. ‘The result is apt to be undue delay, followed by 
unnecessary haste’.199 The accuracy of this assessment would soon be shown. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
UK-US Relations, the Vietnam peace process  
and the Laotian crisis, 1971-1972 
 
 
In Indochina, the most significant event of 1971 took place not in Vietnam or Cambodia but 
Laos. In February the ARVN mounted an operation codenamed Lam Son 719 which involved 
entering Laos to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines. Because of Congressional restrictions 
on Nixon’s ability to commit US troops beyond Vietnam (the legacy of the Cambodian 
episode) the 16,000-strong ARVN force was not accompanied by American ground forces. 
Lam Son 719 was also connected to the stagnant Paris peace process. ‘The diplomacy of 
Vietnam’, Karnow explains, ‘had see-sawed…since the start of the struggle’ with ‘neither side 
willing to deal from weakness and hoping to secure a stronger battlefield position to improve 
its bargaining posture. In effect, with the Paris talks stalled, serious negotiation was only likely 
if one side gained a battlefield advantage. This was how Lam Son 719 linked to the Paris 
negotiations. Importantly, it was also the first combat test of Vietnamization. If the peace 
negotiations continued to go nowhere, Vietnamization still offered the United States an exit 
option – provided, that was, the ARVN could be relied upon to defend South Vietnam after a 
US withdrawal.200 
For Nixon, doing something in Laos was also a personal political necessity. As his 
thoughts turned to re-election, Nixon grew concerned about the still high costs of the war and 
the negative consequences this might have as he launched his bid for a second term. ‘By the 
end of 1970’, Kissinger recalled, ‘we ran the risk that our Vietnam strategy would turn into a 
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debate about the rate of our unilateral withdrawal’.201 To placate US opinion, troop withdrawals 
had to continue with the aim of effectively ending the US ground role by 1972. Given the scale 
of North Vietnamese activity in Laos, however, Nixon and Kissinger worried about a major 
communist offensive in 1972 launched from Laos and designed to cause maximum public 
disquiet in America in the run-up to the US election. Most Americans wanted to bring the 
troops home but if this was followed by the quick loss of South Vietnam, all the previous 
sacrifices would be rendered pointless. Nixon might win votes for terminating the US ground 
troop commitment, but could lose others by losing South Vietnam.202  
There were no guarantees that Thieu’s government would survive following the 
departure of American ground forces and fewer once US air power was withdrawn. In fact, by 
1971, Nixon and Kissinger, accepting this reality, seem to hoped that if South Vietnam was 
able to hold together for a sufficiently decent period of time after a US exit, the RVN’s ultimate 
defeat when it came could be laid at Saigon’s door not Washington’s. This is the so-called 
“decent interval” thesis, first advanced by ex-CIA operative Frank Snepp and subsequently 
taken up by historians.203  
Broadly speaking, Kissinger felt that the US had two options by this point: either 
strengthen the defensive capability of the South Vietnamese or pre-emptively disrupt the 
offensive preparations of the North Vietnamese beginning with Laos. The ‘obvious solution’, 
he suggested, was to keep an American combat division in South Vietnam throughout 1972 as 
a ‘shield’. This would permit the acceleration of the pacification programme and free additional 
ARVN units for front-line operations. However, the US public’s desire to see an end to the 
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American combat role made this solution politically unviable for Nixon.204 As the President 
put it to Kissinger in a ‘cold-blooded’ statement of “decent interval”, ‘if a year or two years 
from now North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if it 
looks as if it's the result of South Vietnamese incompetence’.205 
In December 1970, US strategists decided on a ‘bold and imaginative thrust into the 
enemy’s logistic nerve centre’ in Laos that would ‘disrupt the communist logistics effort…and 
enhance Hanoi’s incentive to negotiate’.206 This was the origin of Lam Son 719. The operation 
was planned to last ninety days but due to the Congressional backlash following the Cambodian 
incursion the ARVN would have no US ground support only air support.207 
In London, the first indication the government received that something major was 
brewing was when William Rogers, the US Secretary of State, told a news conference in 
Washington on 27 January of his objections to the North Vietnamese presence in Laos. ‘There 
are large supplies being built up in that area - in the Panhandle area of Laos. We have been 
using air power to attack those supplies…Whether we will take other action or not we will have 
to wait and see.’208  
In the FCO, it was clear that a military move was in the offing. However, Foreign 
Secretary Douglas-Home predicted considerable embarrassment for the government if 
something explosive occurred and he had to tell parliament he had been kept wholly in the dark 
by the Americans. ‘If there is South Vietnamese action with American air support into Southern 
Laos we shall be under immediate pressure to make some comment here’, he cabled Freeman 
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in Washington. ‘Please point out to the Americans that in their own interests as well as ours, it 
would be helpful to have some indication of what may be afoot and the thinking behind it.’209 
Attempts by Freeman to get information out of the State Department, however, drew a blank.210  
Adding to FCO unease was the fact that Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian Prime Minister, 
did not appear to have been brought into US confidence. According to Douglas-Home, 
Souvanna was ‘very concerned’ about mounting reports of military action and intended to issue 
a ‘strong condemnatory statement’ it his country’s territorial integrity was violated. That would 
be an embarrassment to the UK (which had a ‘special responsibility’ to Laos due to its position 
as co-chairman of the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos, not to mention its 1954 
predecessor).211  
The Heath government thus found itself in a tricky situation. If rumours of a joint US-
ARVN operation conducted without the permission of the Vientiane government proved to be 
well founded, it would be an outrageous violation of Laotian neutrality. Because of the Geneva 
conferences of 1954 and 1962, the UK was morally charged with protecting Laotian neutrality 
and the government was bound to come under parliamentary pressure to issue a statement 
denouncing US and South Vietnamese actions. If a statement was issued, it could trigger a 
crisis in Anglo-American relations.212 
 
On 8 February came confirmation of what most Indochina observers suspected. ‘Today…I 
have ordered the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam to attack the communist North 
Vietnamese bases on the Laotian territory along the Vietnam-Laos border’, South Vietnam’s 
President Thieu announced. ‘This is an operation limited in time as well as in space, with the 
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clear and unique objective of disrupting the supply and infiltration network of the communist 
North Vietnamese troops lying in the Laotian territory.213 
The Americans belatedly informed the British the day before of what was about to 
occur. Briefing Lord Cromer, Freeman’s successor as Ambassador in Washington, the State 
Department stressed that US ‘assistance’ to the ARVN would be limited to ‘air support and 
artillery fire from inside South Vietnam’. There would be no US ground combat forces 
deployed. In the ‘context of Vietnamization’, Lam Son 719 was a combat test of the ARVN 
and, by extension, the Nixon administration’s flagship policy.214 This was not consultation as 
the British wanted. At best it was a courtesy. When Cromer presented his credentials to Nixon 
on the day the invasion was launched, he could only wish the President well in America’s latest 
Indochinese adventure. Nixon, in turn, described Lam Son 719 as a ‘really a big show’ that 
would be ‘a real test’ for the ARVN and Vietnamization.215 
Following Thieu’s announcement, Souvanna issued a public statement on behalf of the 
Laotian government. His reaction was milder than the FCO anticipated. Souvanna pinned 
‘prime responsibility’ for what was happening on the North Vietnamese for ‘spurning…the 
neutrality and territorial integrity’ of Laos in the first place’.216 A few days earlier, Souvanna 
admitted to British diplomats in Vientiane that the Panhandle area was no longer under his 
government’s control.217 In his public statement, however, while denouncing the DRV’s 
interference, Souvanna took a strictly neutralist view and demanded that ‘all foreign troops’ 
withdraw. He also called on those powers that presided over the 1962 Geneva agreement on 
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Laos – among them Britain – to take all ‘necessary measures’ to protect his country’s 
neutrality.218  
The UK position was further complicated by its status as Geneva 1954 co-chair. On the 
one hand, the British were obliged to respect the wishes of the Laotian government; on the 
other hand, Souvanna seemed to want the UK to press the US to call off the operation, a request 
which would neither be well-received in nor make an impact on Washington. Anglo-American 
relations had undergone something of a revival under the Conservatives and the government 
was reluctant to take actions which risked arresting this progress. Further problems were posed 
by the Geneva 1962 agreement which committed Britain to uphold Laotian neutrality at the 
same times as it was committed by the 1954 Geneva settlement to a peaceful solution to the 
war in Vietnam – indeed the UK subscribed to the US policy of Vietnamization precisely 
because it meant de-Americanizing the conflict and bringing South Vietnam closer to the 
neutralized status mapped out by the 1954 accords. In view of the stated goals of Lam Son 719, 
namely to protect Vietnamization and the American withdrawal time-table, should the UK 
support the operation despite Souvanna’s appeal? 
The obvious first move was to ask the Vientiane government for clarification of its 
position. From this, it emerged that Souvanna’s greatest concern was China. Maintaining the 
appearance of Laotian neutrality was of the utmost importance. If the Vientiane government 
publicly sanctioned the South Vietnamese invasion this would make it US-RVN ‘accomplices’, 
destroy any pretence of neutrality, and possibly invite PRC military intervention. It was 
necessary therefore for the Vientiane government to publicly condemn Lam Son 719 and 
demand the withdrawal of the invasion forces. In private, however, the Laotian authorities were 
more willing to accept what was happening and pleased at the prospect of the North Vietnamese 
being given a bloody-nose. As long as the campaign was ‘short, sharp and sweet and produced 
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the desired results’, the Laotian Foreign Minister told the British Ambassador in Vientiane, 
‘then all might be well’.219  
On the back of this assurance, the Heath government felt able to take a firmer line in 
public in support of the RVN action. On 9 February, the FCO issued a statement describing the 
move into Laos as ‘fully understandable’ in view of the presence of North Vietnamese troops 
in the country.220 This, however, brought forth criticism from the USSR: Tass accused the 
British of ‘prostituting their co-chairman role by supporting the US’ while Izvestia called Heath 
the ‘defender of bloody American plundering’.221  
Was there any justification behind the Soviet charge that the UK was not living up to 
its peacekeeping role? Preserving good UK-US relations was unquestionably high on the Heath 
government’s agenda. In another public comment, Douglas-Home emphasised that Lam Son 
719 was necessary to preserve Laotian independence in the long-term and protect 
Vietnamization and US disengagement in the short-term, a statement that earned him the 
personal thanks of the US Secretary of State.222 The UK approach also pleased the Laotians. 
According to the British Embassy in Vientiane, Souvanna admitted privately that the neutrality 
of Laos had long since been ‘blown’ by the DRV and he personally ‘appreciated the feeling 
behind HMG’s statement’.223  
In London, the government dismissed Soviet jibes. Moreover, as the FCO Deputy 
Under-Secretary for Asia pointed out, the UK took its Geneva responsibilities ‘very seriously’. 
The same could not be said for the Soviets who were not only supplying North Vietnam with 
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‘large quantities’ of arms but showed no interest in the reconvening of the Geneva conference 
in order to get back to the principle of internationally-recognised neutrality for Laos.224 
 
In Laos, meanwhile, Lam Son 719, proceeded in confusion.225 Monitoring events, the FCO was 
initially optimistic about ARVN prospects. Eight days into the operation, Douglas-Home 
informed the Cabinet that the South Vietnamese would probably have ‘little difficulty’ in 
destroying enemy arms dumps and disrupting DRV supply lines.226 Unknown to the British, 
the ARVN was beginning to struggle. On 12 February, Thieu, fearing the cost to his best units, 
ordered his commanders to proceed with extreme caution.227 This order was issued at a time 
when the ARVN faced only light resistance. But then, in mid-month, main-force North 
Vietnamese units, supported by tanks and heavy artillery, joined the fight. US intelligence had 
failed to pick up the presence in the Panhandle area of these battle-hardened troops.228 From a 
North Vietnamese perspective, it was important to protect their position in Laos and use the 
opportunity to smash the South Vietnamese.229 
Publicly, Nixon maintained an air of confidence. ‘The South Vietnamese have run into 
very heavy resistance,’ he told a news conference on 17 February. ‘We expected that.’230 As 
fighting intensified, Cromer, after sounding out US officials, cabled the FCO on 26 February 
to say that far from the ‘pushover’ that some in Washington had anticipated, the operation was 
shaping into a potential disaster. This would not only dent US confidence in Vietnamization 
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but could impose strain on Anglo-American relations if the United States reacted by re-opening 
the air war against North Vietnam. ‘If the South Vietnamese suffer a severe mauling we may 
have to expect an agonising reappraisal of US policy on Vietnam’, Cromer warned.231  
In London, FCO officials concluded that a ‘some sort of draw’ was now the best if not 
the optimum outcome. From an American viewpoint, ‘such an outcome would be good enough 
to let the President’s policy of Vietnamization and American troop withdrawals continue but 
would make it clear…that a military solution in Indo-China is really not practicable’. In 
essence, the FCO hoped that if both sides suffered military losses they would both reject 
thoughts of battlefield victory and make a genuine effort to make the Paris peace process 
succeed.232 
By early March, even a draw seemed optimistic as the ARVN in Laos began to 
disintegrate. ‘The Communist counter attacks…have shown that they will fight hard to prevent 
the complete cutting of the Ho Chi Minh trail’, Douglas-Home told the Cabinet on 4 March. 
‘Casualties have been heavy’.233 Unknown to the British, at the end of February Thieu had 
scaled back his ambition; his aim now was to score a purely symbolic rather tangible success 
by capturing the town of Tchepone, holding it for a time, and then withdraw.234  
By mid-March, the US government was privately anxious but still publicly positive. On 
14 March, Nixon told reporters that the ARVN had ‘come of age’ and had fought hard. ‘[W]hat 
has already been accomplished in Laos at this time has insured even more the plan for 
withdrawal of American troops…the disruption of the supply lines of the enemy through 
Laos…has very seriously damaged the enemy's ability to wage effective action against our 
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remaining forces in Vietnam’.235 In reality, the ARVN had proven to be no match for the North 
Vietnamese.236 From Saigon, Alexander Haig, Kissinger’s deputy, reported on 19 March that 
ARVN commanders, backed by Thieu, were determined to call off the operation and undertake 
an ‘orderly and tactically sound’ retreat.237 What in fact occurred was chaos. In the event, US 
helicopters had to be sent into Laos en masse to rescue the ARVN from total annihilation.  
The historiographical consensus is that Lam Son 719 was not only a ‘first rate disaster’ 
for the ARVN, exposing ‘grave deficiencies in planning, organisation, leadership, motivation 
and operational expertise’, but a defeat for Vietnamization.238 At the time, in contrast, Nixon 
was defiant. In April, he declared that the South Vietnamese had ‘demonstrated that without 
American advisers they could fight effectively against the very best troops North Vietnam 
could put in the field…Vietnamization has succeeded.’ Because of the ‘achievements of the 
South Vietnamese operation in Laos’ Nixon planned to withdraw 100,000 more US troops by 
December to bring the total withdrawals since he took office to 365,000.239  
Hindsight suggests that Nixon was already privately committed to the “decent interval” 
strategy. An objective assessment of Lam Son 719 showed that the ARVN could not fight 
effectively without American advisors – the opposite of Nixon’s publicly-stated conclusion – 
but might, with more aid and training, hold the line long enough after full US disengagement 
for the eventual (indeed the certain) North Vietnamese victory to be seen by the world as a 
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South Vietnamese not an American defeat.240 In London, the FCO seemed equally deluded as 
to the conclusions to be drawn from Lam Son 719. According to the Head of the Southeast 
Asia Department, the ARVN had passed its test with the operation demonstrating the 
‘continued success’ of Vietnamization.241 In Washington, Cromer was very sceptical. Nixon’s 
defence of Lam Son 719 was not amongst his ‘most convincing performances’. In terms of 
Vietnamization, the Ambassador noted how the President made no mention of the critical role 
of US air support which had inflicted most of the North Vietnamese casualties Nixon referred 
to and helped ensure that the ARVN retreat was not even more costly.242 Nor was Nixon’s 
political opponents satisfied. Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, JFK’s brother, called the 
Laos decision a ‘nightmare’, while Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, called Lam Son 719 a ‘massive deception or a massive 
misjudgement, or both’.243 
In private, US policymakers were seriously worried. Vietnamization was not working. 
Or rather it would need a lot more time and American investment if the South Vietnamese were 
to get close to being able to defend themselves once all US forces had departed. ‘[W]e’re not 
going to lose out there’, Nixon insisted to Kissinger in the aftermath. ‘I determined that long 
ago. We wouldn’t have gone into Cambodia; we wouldn’t have gone into Laos, if we had not 
made that determination’.244  
But not losing was not the same as winning. Victory was no longer on Nixon’s agenda. 
Nor had it been at any point given the legacy bequeathed by Johnson, namely a peace process 
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and an end to the bombing of North Vietnam. Now, as he looked towards his re-election 
campaign, peace with honour remained Nixon’s goal. This would not be defeat, which it was 
his top priority to avoid, but it would provide the ultimate exit option. If Lam Son 719 did 
anything it encouraged the Nixon administration to take the Paris peace process more 
seriously.245  
 
Nixon later remembered the first months of 1971 as ‘the lowest point of my first term as 
President’, a period when the ‘problems we confronted were so overwhelming and so 
apparently impervious to anything we could do to change them that it seemed possible that I 
might not even be nominated for re-election.’246  
Among these problems was a new wave of US domestic discontent connected to the 
Vietnam war and the Laotian fiasco and matched in Congress which voted to cease US 
involvement in the war by the end of 1972.247 In June, Colonel Robert Heinl wrote a damning 
article for the Armed Forces Journal on the disintegration of US armed forces in Vietnam. 
‘[O]ur army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse’ he argued, ‘with 
individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and 
noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near mutinous’. Desertion 
rates were ‘startlingly high’.248 According to historian Marilyn Young the headline message of 
the Heinl thesis was that the ‘ARVN had better fight their war because the US Army would 
have difficulty doing it for very much longer’.249 
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Also in mid-1971, the New York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers, a 
supposedly top secret Defence Department study on how the United States ended up in 
Vietnam. The study was leaked by a Pentagon official, Daniel Ellsberg, who became 
disillusioned over the extent of official lying about Vietnam in the Kennedy and Johnson 
years.250 The Pentagon Papers had an unexpected UK angle. On 15 June, the New York Times 
published a telegram sent by Harold Wilson to Lyndon Johnson in June 1965 in which Wilson 
warned that his government might have to disassociate itself from the US bombing of North 
Vietnam unless the Americans showed willing to get peace talks going. LBJ gave Wilson an 
assurance, but as the London Times pointed out, Wilson had been duped because the Pentagon 
Papers showed that ‘negotiations…were far from Mr Johnson’s mind’.251  
The leak did not embarrass Heath directly, only his predecessor, but at a wider level the 
FCO was worried by the scale of the breach of security in Washington and concerned about 
the future confidentiality of UK-US diplomatic interactions.252 Nixon, for his part, was enraged 
by the ‘violation of top secret classifications’ which posed a danger to national security and did 
harm to US relations with allies like Britain. Consequently, his administration went to court to 
try an block further publication of leaked material.253 In London, the Heath government saw 
the Pentagon Papers as an opportunity to support Nixon in ways that could help Anglo-
American relations. Ignoring the issue of press freedom, Douglas-Home determined to back 
any action taken by the US administration in ‘supressing further revelations’.254 Kissinger was 
grateful for the support, while Lord Cromer, with an eye on the “special relationship”, told the 
                                                 
250 Melvin Small, ‘Will the Real Daniel Ellsberg Please Stand Up’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2003), 
pp.757-761. 
251 Times, 16 June 1971. 
252 FCO telegram 1705 to Washington Embassy, 19 June 1971, PREM15/651. 
253 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, pp.253-258. 
254 FCO telegram 1705 to Washington Embassy, 19 June 1971, PREM15/651. 
65 
 
FCO that there was ‘much to be said for continuing to help the Americans over this’.255 
Publicly, the Heath government expressed concern about ‘unauthorised publication of 
confidential exchanges’ and insisted that confidentiality was essential ‘in the interest of good 
relations’ between governments.256  
As it happened, the Nixon administration was defeated in the Supreme Court in a 
landmark victory for press freedom and the New York Times was permitted to continue 
serialization. The saga of the Pentagon Papers added to the agitated political atmosphere in 
America over the trial of Lieutenant William Calley for his part in the massacre of civilians at 
My Lai in 1968. According to one opinion poll, 58 percent of Americans believed US 
involvement in Vietnam was not just wrong but morally wrong, and an even higher percentage 
simply wanted to be rid of the Vietnam commitment as soon as possible.257 
 
When the new fighting season began in Vietnam in the autumn following the six-month 
monsoon, UK policy remained as it had been for some time. The Heath government supported 
US efforts to contain communism in Indochina and Southeast Asia generally but it was also 
committed to a peaceful resolution both from conviction and from the legacy of Geneva 1954, 
and welcomed the US military draw-down and Vietnamization as positive aids towards this 
goal. However, at the wider level of Anglo-American relations, UK support for Nixon’s 
Vietnam policy, and for his handling of the Pentagon Papers, did not prevent tensions in other 
areas including Cold War diplomacy. In July came the momentous announcement that Nixon 
planned to visit communist China in February 1972. The move – described as the US ‘opening’ 
of China – marked a massive shift in American Cold War policy and was designed, in hindsight, 
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to exploit Sino-Soviet rivalry by playing the Chinese off against the Soviets. At the time, Nixon 
insisted that his reaching out to China would not be at the ‘expense’ of America’s ‘old 
friends’.258 Even so one of those old friends, Britain, experienced what Andrew Scott calls 
‘acute upset’ at the lack of consultation on such a potentially Cold War game-changing 
initiative.259  
On the face of it the evolution in US policy towards China ought to have been welcomed 
by the British. As the Times pointed, Nixon’s ‘stunning, diplomatic coup’ might encourage the 
North Vietnamese to take the peace process more seriously if the PRC, in return for improved 
relations with the US, was to press its ally to compromise.260 The Heath Cabinet was in fact 
aware of this potential benefit but was still upset at the absence of any advance warning of what 
the Americans planned. In consequence, Nixon’s ‘sudden action…undermined confidence in 
the US’.261  
The announcement of Nixon’s PRC trip was followed by another ‘shock’ to the UK 
when the US administration imposed a 10 percent import surcharge and suspended dollar 
convertibility in an attempt to ease America’s economic troubles.262 Nixon’s fait accompli 
threatened to solve some of America’s economic difficulties by causing economic problems 
for the UK and left the Heath government more inclined than ever to draw closer to Western 
Europe.263 Ironically, while the British complained about the lack of US consultation on the 
opening of China, Kissinger was complaining about a lack of information from the UK on its 
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EEC approach. If the UK was now prioritising EEC relations, Kissinger felt, it was maybe time 
to ‘cut them off from intelligence special information they are getting here…If they are going 
to share everything with the Europeans we can’t trust them for the special relationship’.264  
By the autumn, Anglo-American relations were still tense. Nixon, however, seems to 
have sensed danger in this discord and decided (to Kissinger’s dismay) to send ‘warm personal 
regards’ to Heath following the UK government’s success in passing its EEC-entry legislation 
through parliament. The message was received with ‘great pleasure’ by Heath.265  
As far as Vietnam was concerned, the cooling of Kissinger towards the UK was a 
concern for the FCO which had come to rely on the US National Security chief for information 
on the war and the peace process.266 Against this background, both generally and specifically 
on Vietnam, Heath prepared to meet Nixon for a two-day conference at Bermuda. A FCO brief 
for Heath concluded that UK-US relations were presently in a stage of ‘transition’ and there 
was bound to some tension until a ‘new’ or ‘different’ relationship was established. Bermuda 
should thus be used by Heath to demonstrate that he was ‘relaxed’ about relations but also to 
obtain information on US policy, including on Vietnam.267  
The press on both sides of the Atlantic played up Anglo-American differences. The 
New York Times felt that the Nixon-Heath talks would ‘initiate long overdue repair work’, 
while the Manchester Guardian hoped that the meeting, following the ‘Nixon shocks’ (the visit 
to China and the end of convertibility), would mark a ‘new chapter’ in relations.268 Concerned 
about this press reporting, Douglas-Home instructed Cromer to tell Kissinger that the ‘alleged 
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bad state of US–UK relations’ was just that, alleged. As for UK entry into Europe, this was not 
a case of ‘off with the old and on with the new’ as far as the “special relationship” was 
concerned.269  
Behind the scenes, the British were worried. The main problem remained the lack of 
consultation by the Americans, not US policies themselves.270 Lord Cromer singled out 
Kissinger and his highly personalised approach to international affairs for blame.271 The 
Washington Embassy had regularly reported to the FCO on Kissinger’s enjoyment of power, 
his obsession with secrecy his determination to keep major decision-making in his own hands, 
but these characteristics had become greater recently. According to Cromer, the Kissinger 
domination meant that US allies, including Britain, were not just kept in ignorance but were 
sometimes ‘positively misled’. However, the only thing worse than losing favour with 
Kissinger was having to rely on a US Secretary of State who ‘probably no longer tries very 
hard’ and a State Department in ‘total eclipse’.272 All-told the prospects going into 1972 were 
not promising. ‘The complexity of the period we are entering demands urgent action to ensure 
that transatlantic relations are restored to the closeness which we are agreed is essential if we 
are to cope with the difficulties that lie ahead’, argued the Assistant Under-Secretary for the 
Americas. Britain’s ‘first task’ was to restore the ‘old ease and closeness’ of communication.273 
Nixon arrived in Bermuda on 20 December. ‘[W]e are the fourth of four very historic 
meetings that have been held here’, Nixon remarked. ‘1953, Prime Minister Churchill and 
President Eisenhower; 1957, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan; 1961, 
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President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan; and now Prime Minister Heath and I’.274 
Over the course of two days, the leaders discussed a range of topics including Britain’s relations 
with Europe, SALT and China. Vietnam was covered when Heath requested an update on US 
military withdrawals. These were going ‘pretty well’, Nixon confirmed, and although the 
enemy remained ‘active’ the draw-down would continue during 1972. Heath was also reassured 
to learn that the Americans would continue to impress on the North Vietnamese in Paris the 
need for a cease-fire.275 
On the wider plane of relations Nixon found the talks with Heath ‘extremely valuable’. 
There would always be ‘tactical’ disagreements amongst allies but these could be resolved by 
‘consultation and discussion’. Heath might have pointed out that consultation and discussion 
had been lacking on the US side in recent times but confined himself to agreeing that a ‘heathy 
relationship can withstand change’. The UK and the EEC ‘should maintain the closest possible 
links with the United States, based on the vast area of common interests which we shall 
continue to share’. On the face of it the Bermuda meeting brought about a  realignment. To 
Heath, the meeting ‘confirmed’ the ‘abiding nature of the Anglo-American relationship’. For 
his part, Nixon was ‘reassured of the fact that that special relationship…is as strong now, and 
even more necessary now than ever before’.276  
In their joint communiqué Nixon seemed content to use Heath’s terminology in 
describing UK-US relations and committed himself publicly to greater consultation. ‘In view 
of the significance of the natural relationship [emphasis added] between the United Kingdom 
and the United States’, the two leaders ‘resolved to maintain their close and continuing 
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consultation at all levels in their approach to world problems’.277 As so often, the US rhetorical 
commitment to consultation would soon fall down in practice. 
  
                                                 
277 Heath-Nixon joint statement, 21 December 1971, PPPUS. 
71 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
UK-US relations and Nixon’s search for  
“peace with honor”, 1972-1973 
 
As 1972 dawned, Vietnam, and a major development in US policy, soon put Nixon’s 
commitment to US-UK consultation to the test. On 13 January, Nixon announced that a further 
70,000 US troops would be out of Vietnam by 1 May, reducing the overall force level to 69,000 
(down from the half-a-million he had inherited from Johnson).278 This was followed by a 
televised Presidential address on 25 January in which Nixon made what he called a ‘generous 
and far-reaching’ proposal to end the war based on the withdrawal of all American forces 
within six months of a cease-fire, the speedy return of all prisoners of war, and appropriate 
arrangements for the security of the RVN.279 Nixon had wanted to make an ‘all-out speech’ for 
some time.280 Now he got his way and significantly used the address to reveal the existence of 
the top secret US-DRV (Kissinger-Le Duc Tho) talks, which had formed a hidden parallel set 
of negotiations to the formal public peace process, to prove his commitment to peace.281  
The secret US-North Vietnamese talks had begun, Nixon explained, so that the two 
sides could ‘talk frankly…free from the pressure of public debate’. But progress had been 
‘disappointing’ and the American people now ‘deserved an accounting of why it has been 
disappointing’. The DRV had misled the American people by publicly criticising the US 
administration for failing to respond to their peace proposals and the time had come, said 
Nixon, to set the record straight. Kissinger had in fact put forward ‘good-faith 
counterproposals’ which had gone unanswered by Hanoi. In May 1971, the US agreed to no 
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longer seek simultaneous withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese forces from South 
Vietnam; mutual withdrawal would be replaced by unilateral American withdrawal. The 
administration believed that Vietnamization would ensure the survival of South Vietnam 
without the need for a major US military presence, and counterbalance a continued North 
Vietnamese military presence in the RVN.282  
Needless to say, Nixon gave no hint of “decent interval” thinking but it is likely that he 
and Kissinger hoped that a cosmetic arrangement allowing for early US disengagement would 
hold for a reasonable period of time, but when the inevitable communist push for reunification 
occurred and the RVN collapsed it would be seen as a South Vietnamese not a US defeat.283 
Whatever the truth of the matter, Kissinger considered Nixon’s speech one of his ‘most 
dramatic and impressive’.284 In London, the FCO was taken unawares – no advance notice was 
given – but officials were gratified to learn of the Kissinger-Tho channel. However, they also 
officials suspected that in terms of timing Nixon’s hand had been forced by intelligence reports 
of a possible communist offensive timed to coincide with Nixon’s visit to China in mid-
February. The US administration did not wish to appear as though its peace offer was made 
‘under pressure’ of North Vietnamese battlefield progress.285 London policymakers also 
suspected that Nixon’s announcement was intended to ensure that he arrived in Beijing with a 
‘solid’ US domestic position.286  
In his memoirs, Kissinger confirmed the correctness of this contemporary UK 
assessment. America’s Vietnam policy going into 1972 was a ‘considerable success’. Domestic 
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opposition had lessened, the North Vietnamese had been thrown ‘off stride’ by US diplomacy, 
and Nixon was in a ‘solid’ position to take ‘strong action’ in defence of South Vietnam if or 
when it came to it. ‘If we could weather the Communist offensive’, if it took place, Kissinger 
wrote, ‘the President could go to Peking [Beijing]…with the hope that we could begin the 
construction of a new international order’.287  
Reaction to the speech, recalled Kissinger, was ‘stunned surprise both at our long record 
of efforts and at the sweep of our proposals’.288 The New York Times wrote that Nixon’s peace 
proposals represented a ‘major advance over the administration’s previous public positions’ 
and concluded that they ‘merited support from all shades of American opinion’.289 In London, 
the FCO was not so impressed. ‘The proposal contains very little that was not…in the…earlier 
public negotiating offer’, officials concluded. At best, Nixon’s statement was a ‘comprehensive 
synthesis’ of American and South Vietnamese negotiating positions previously presented 
separately.290 Although the FCO was lukewarm, the Cabinet welcomed the statement insofar 
as it confirmed Nixon’s commitment to a negotiated settlement. ‘This statement of the 
American negotiating position should help to convince public opinion…that it is a reasonable 
and constructive [offer]’, ministers concluded.291  
The Heath government doubted that Hanoi would respond positively to US terms but it 
still publicly praised the Nixon plan as a ‘constructive and positive’ development.292 At the 
same time, the UK press speculated about the amount of ‘advance notice’ the US government 
gave to its British ally about this major initiative, and whether the Kissinger-Tho channel had 
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been known to the FCO.293 The truth of the matter is that the British had no inkling of a parallel 
bilateral US-DRV peace process until just a few hours before Nixon’s speech when Lord 
Cromer was briefed by the State Department and told that a ‘favourable public reception’ to 
US peace proposals in the UK would be ‘deeply appreciated’.294 Kissinger passed Cromer the 
full text of the Nixon speech – but only slightly ahead of delivery.295  
UK policymakers were disappointed by all this. At one level, they had no right to 
advance consultation on a matter primarily concerning the United States and North Vietnam. 
At another level, given worries in the FCO about US unilateralism, Nixon’s Bermuda 
undertaking on consultation, and the apparent working assumption in Washington that the UK 
would automatically agree with all US initiatives, the President’s speech re-opened tensions. 
According to the Times, the FCO could not hide its ‘embarrassment’ at having been kept 
‘largely in the dark about the 30 months of secret talks’. Nixon’s ‘technique of using Dr 
Kissinger for diplomatic moves that are kept secret from all but a handful of confidants is well 
known in allied capitals’ but ‘the latest disclosure is an awkward one for Mr Heath’ with 
implications beyond Vietnam in demonstrating that Anglo-American relations generally were 
not as aligned as they might be.296 
 
The DRV responded to Nixon’s speech on 31 January. Rejecting US proposals, Hanoi 
published its own account of the negotiations and reissued a peace plan it first put to Kissinger 
in June 1971. The DRV described the differences between the US and North Vietnamese 
approaches as ‘fundamental – like night and day’.297 Amongst other things, Hanoi demanded 
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US respect for Vietnamese unity, a total withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam while 
permitting those of North Vietnam to remain, a full exchange of prisoners of war (POWs), and 
the establishment in South Vietnam of a National Council of Reconciliation and Concord to 
prepare for elections in the south and ultimately reunification ‘through peaceful means’.298  
According to Kissinger, Hanoi’s proposal was a ‘slightly reworked’ version of a 
previous proposal posited on the release of US POWs in return for Thieu’s immediate 
resignation and the dismantling of the RVN police, army and pacification programme. 
Unsurprisingly, the US government refused to accept terms which effectively surrendered the 
RVN to a communist future. However, Kissinger recalled, critics in the US were quick to claim 
that the diplomatic stalemate was ‘entirely the administration’s fault’ for showing too much 
regard for the views of the Thieu government which was increasingly seen by US opinion as 
fascistic, authoritarian and not an ally that America should spend any more blood defending.299 
By the end of January 1972, the prospects of “peace with honor” did not seem good. 
There remained a possibility that Nixon and Kissinger’s wider foreign policy initiatives – the 
pursuit of improved relations with the USSR and PRC – would impact positively on the 
Vietnam peace process. Nixon came to power convinced that the time had come for a re-
evaluation of American Cold War policy. The combination of Nixon’s political pragmatism 
and Kissinger’s realpolitik duly produced a new approach based on détente.300 In pursuit of this 
aim, especially a SALT deal with the USSR to limit nuclear weapons, the US government was 
ready to manipulate Soviet fears of China. By 1969, the USSR and PRC were close to war and 
Nixon and Kissinger planned to play the China “card” (seeking to create a close relationship 
with the Chinese) to scare the USSR into believing a US-PRC axis was forming and thus to 
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push the USSR to seek better relations with the US as a counter. And the US price for closer 
relations was détente in general and SALT in particular.301  
Nixon and Kissinger also practised linkage by connecting various problems in the Cold 
War. Vietnam is an example of this. By 1969, North Vietnam was reliant on military aid from 
China and the USSR. Soviet surface-to-air missiles, radar, and communications equipment 
helped with DRV defence, and Chinese rice and supplies of smaller arms, machine guns, 
grenades, and ammunition was also important. By the early 1970s, however, Nixon and 
Kissinger hoped that both the USSR and PRC, in return for improved relations with the US, 
would either end their aid to North Vietnam or pressurise Hanoi into giving the Americans 
acceptable peace terms.302 The US strategy of détente and the concept of linkage evolved 
gradually but came to spectacular fruition in February 1972 when Nixon became the first US 
President to visit the PRC in what he called a ‘week that changed the world’.303  
The 1972 US-PRC summit helped improve bilateral relations and furthered Nixon and 
Kissinger’s opening to China in ways that did indeed make the USSR nervous and more 
inclined to agree to US wishes for a SALT treaty. On Vietnam, Nixon found the Chinese 
sympathetic to the American desire to get out of the war with honour, but because of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, Mao Zedong, the PRC leader, was reluctant to abandon the DRV in case it 
joined the Soviet camp and China found it had an enemy on its southern border. The PRC 
supported a peace settlement in principle but were not prepared to force North Vietnam to meet 
the US position.304 In his recent history of Vietnam, Max Hastings shows that Nixon and 
Kissinger indicated to the Chinese that  the US would not care very much about what happened 
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to South Vietnam after peace as long as the communists allowed a ‘reasonable interval’ (in 
other words a “decent interval”) between US withdrawal and the final communist take-over.305 
In London, the Heath government watched events closely and took note of the Vietnam 
aspects of the Nixon visit to China. From the FCO perspective, Douglas-Home told the Cabinet, 
peace in Vietnam probably hinged more on the US and North Vietnam coming to terms than 
on PRC or USSR diplomacy. Beyond this, he felt that Nixon playing Cold War peacemaker 
would ‘probably be of considerable assistance’ when he sought re-election in November 1972. 
Furthermore, the visit might also result in ‘increasing anxiety on the part of the Government of 
the Soviet Union about Chinese intentions in the short term, particularly if it seemed likely that 
United States policy towards the People’s Republic of China became less hostile.’ 306  
In actual fact, in May 1972 Nixon would become the first US President to visit the 
USSR too when he had a summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow at which a 
SALT agreement (SALT-1) was reached, a development seen as a peak moment in détente, 
although the USSR, like the PRC, while supporting a Vietnam peace agreement, was not ready 
to put pressure on the DRV to come to terms with the US.307 
 
The North Vietnamese seem to have concluded the same thing. At the end of March 1972 the 
DRV launched a major (“spring”) offensive, invading South Vietnam with three divisions and 
Russian tanks and seeking to capture the northern provinces of the south in the hope that its 
negotiating power would be boosted by battlefield victories.308 In Washington, Kissinger had 
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been urging Nixon for some time to consider resuming the bombing of North Vietnam and 
events would soon play to Kissinger’s advantage.309  
In London, the Foreign Secretary described to the Cabinet ‘a military operation of 
considerable magnitude’.310 In all, the North Vietnamese committed 120,000 soldiers to the 
offensive.311 FCO officials reflected that a major DRV move ‘had been expected for some 
months’ with the aim of demonstrating that Vietnamization had failed and thus ‘increasing 
their own leverage in Paris’. If the US responded with ‘concentrated air attacks’ against North 
Vietnam, however, the UK, in its on-going capacity as Geneva co-chair, would be obliged to 
comment publicly. In any statement, the government would have to balance its continued hope 
for a peaceful diplomatic outcome to the war with condemnation of the DRV and backing for 
the US.312 When the South Vietnamese Ambassador in London demanded a strong British 
condemnation of North Vietnam, Douglas-Home explained that while the UK ‘deplored’ the 
invasion it was ‘difficult’ for Britain ‘to take any specific action’ beyond words of criticism.313  
By  early April, the immediate crisis appeared to have abated, the Cabinet noted, as the 
South Vietnamese, backed strongly by US forces, steadily blunted the offensive.314 At this 
point, however, the Nixon administration decided to consolidate the position in South Vietnam 
by bombing North Vietnam. Operation Linebacker, which began on 16 April, involved 700 B-
52 sorties during the remainder of the month with the Hanoi-Haiphong area the main target.315 
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The FCO accepted Linebacker as a ‘logical development of current US policy’ and 
consistent with US warnings of retaliation if the DRV interfered overtly in the RVN but 
rumours that the US Navy also planned to mine Haiphong disturbed officials as this risked 
‘direct confrontation’ with China or the Soviet Union if their vessels were sunk.316 In Cabinet, 
Douglas-Home thought that the USSR might cancel Nixon’s forthcoming visit to Moscow due 
to the crisis.317 Nixon himself, however, saw no reason compromise as he guessed that the 
USSR would still welcome him due to its fear of China. ‘The bastards have never been bombed 
like they’re going to be bombed this time’, he said in private about the North Vietnamese.318  
It was not long before the Heath government found itself under popular pressure in the 
UK to condemn the US bombing. In 1966, when the Labour government publicly expressed 
unease at US air attacks on the populous suburbs of Hanoi, Heath, as leader of the opposition, 
had been critical. It was ‘illogical’, he argued, for the government to ‘approve general US 
military policy in Vietnam, but to disassociate themselves from attacks on specific targets of 
military significance’ despite the risk of civilian casualties.319 Now, six years later, Heath and 
his government showed consistency in accepting that Linebacker was justifiable in view of the 
provocation of North Vietnam’s attack on South Vietnam.320 The supportive UK stance 
certainly helped with Anglo-American relations with Kissinger personally thanking Douglas-
Home for British backing.321 In return, Kissinger became more forthcoming about US policy. 
The bombing was intended to damage North Vietnam’s war-making capacity, he explained, 
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but would also serve the purpose of ‘intimidating’ the USSR which might consequently become 
more receptive to abandoning the DRV as the price of closer relations with the US.322 
On 4 May, the US government extended the duration of Linebacker and the bombing 
would continue for the rest of the month.323 Then, on 8 May, Nixon announced that the US 
Navy had now mined Haiphong harbour. Despite US attempts to negotiate constructively in 
Paris, the DRV ‘flatly refused’ to reciprocate. Accordingly, North Vietnam ‘must be denied 
the weapons and supplies it needs to continue the aggression’ in the south,  hence the sealing-
off Haiphong to Sino-Soviet shipping.324 Privately, the mining reflected Nixon’s determination 
to ‘stop at nothing to bring the enemy to his knees’.325 To the FCO, the move might yet have a 
beneficial impact on the war situation and could persuade the USSR into working harder to 
bring about a peace settlement rather than face the prospect of Vietnam escalating out of 
control.326 Nixon, as we have seen, gambled that the USSR, worried about China, would not 
destroy the US-Soviet Moscow summit – and he gambled correctly. Even though a Soviet 
merchant ship was sunk at Haiphong, the USSR went ahead with the meeting. Later that May, 
Nixon and Brezhnev signed an Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty alongside SALT-I.327 As 
Douglas-Home commented in Cabinet, the USSR was evidently ‘inclined to regard the war in 
Vietnam as a relatively minor obstacle to the development of better relations with the United 
States’.328 
Two hours before Nixon went public with the decision to mine Haiphong, Heath 
received a message from the President explaining the decision as necessary to end ‘this 
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disruptive and wasteful war’ and hoping that he could count on the Prime Minister’s 
‘understanding and support’.329 Despite the short notice, Heath replied that he was ‘most 
grateful’ for the message and offered full support, including pressing the USSR to support a 
negotiated settlement.330 Despite this, the UK government walked a diplomatic tightrope. As 
the FCO’s Southeast Asia experts noted, supporting Nixon was necessary for reasons to do 
with the “special relationship” but ‘too strong’ a level of support was incompatible with 
Britain’s responsibility as co-chair of Geneva 1954.331  
Privately, the UK government also questioned the legality of the mining of DRV 
territorial waters.332 The FCO Legal Department counselled that the US action probably 
violated international law and cautioned that the government could be placed in an 
embarrassing position if it publicly backed Nixon’s initiative. When the US authorities learned 
of UK unease, Kissinger asked that Heath issue a general statement of support rather than a 
specific endorsement of the mining.333 On reflection, the Cabinet Office felt it safe for the 
government state publicly that it recognised the US right to retaliate against DRV provocation 
but add that it sought (as indeed it did) to cooperate with the USSR in reactivating the 1954 
Geneva conference since the Paris peace process was so stalled.334 This statement, when issued, 
benefited Anglo-American relations with the Nixon administration expressing appreciation.335 
In practice, however, the idea of a revived Geneva conference went nowhere due to Soviet 
opposition and the Cabinet was left to hope for renewed direct US-DRV talks.336 
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Linebacker was halted in June. By then, US air-power had successfully repulsed the North 
Vietnamese advance (communist losses were reported to be around 100,000). In Hanoi, DRV 
leaders concluded that it was only US air-power that had saved South Vietnam and that it was 
thus wise to make concessions in the peace process that would allow full US disengagement, 
including its air force, so that South Vietnam would not have similar support in the future.337  
In its own review of the offensive, the FCO unwittingly endorsed Hanoi’s conclusion. 
Together with Lamson 719, recent military events showed the fragility of Vietnamization. ‘The 
South Vietnamese may have taken over responsibility for the ground fighting, but they have 
also been conditioned to rely on massive fire power and the use of air power’. Vietnamization 
without US air-power was ‘never a realistic aim or programme’. In a hint of “decent interval”, 
FCO officials suspected that in the final analysis Nixon would leave South Vietnam to its fate 
and not re-deploy US air power once withdrawn.338  
Nixon himself, however, was publicly confident about future prospects. The military 
situation had been ‘turned around’ by Linebacker and the mining of Haiphong, he told reporters 
on 30 June. In contrast to FCO assessments, he declared that ‘the ability of the South 
Vietnamese to defend themselves…has been demonstrated’. At the same time, he looked 
forward to ‘constructive…negotiations’ in Paris so that ‘this war can be ended’.339  
As previously noted, North Vietnam was now ready to make concessions in the 
negotiations to enable total US military withdrawal. The DRV was also thinking of “decent 
interval” and suspected that once the US was gone, if North Vietnam delayed long enough 
before conquering South Vietnam, ‘the Americans would not come back even if you offered 
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them candy’.340 When the Paris talks resumed in July, US-DRV differences quickly narrowed; 
the Americans wanted out and the North Vietnamese wanted to make it possible for them to 
get out.341 According to Kissinger, the DRV was ready to make peace was ‘afraid’ of the 
reaction of the NLF (or Provisional Revolutionary Government, as it called itself).342 Heath, 
meanwhile, sent Kissinger a message of ‘full support’ in advance his peace agenda.343  
Success was tantalisingly close on 8 October when Le Duc Tho made a vital 
concession: the DRV no longer insisted on Theiu’s resignation as a condition of peace and 
proposed instead that the RVN and NLF-PRG join with neutrals in a National Council of 
Reconciliation and Concord to administer the south in the aftermath of peace. Thieu was 
reportedly unhappy but at least he would retain some political authority under this 
arrangement.344 In the FCO, officials agreed that Tho’s concession was very important and 
hoped that peace would soon come. But they also worried about Theiu’s capacity to wreck the 
process – Thieu knew that without the Americans he would be living on borrowed time and 
had no interest in making disengagement easy for Nixon.345  
At the same time, the UK media and public opinion was pressing the government to do 
all it could to help end the war; from an even more critical perspective, the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) blasted Heath for standing on the sidelines as though he somehow wished the 
war to continue, an unfair accusation.346 The FCO remained ‘hopeful’ that peace was imminent 
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but also worried that if it did not materialise, the  Americans would bomb North Vietnam again 
and put UK-US relations under strain.347  
To begin with, FCO fears seemed unfounded. On 21 October, the US and DRV reached 
a provisional agreement.348  Fatefully, Kissinger declared publicly that ‘peace is at hand’.349 In 
actual fact peace depended on Thieu, but three days later, on 24 October, South Vietnam’s 
leader rejected the peace treaty and called for the destruction of all communist forces.350 With 
this, the peace process collapsed once more. A ‘dismayed’ Kissinger told the UK Embassy in 
Washington that it was now unlikely that the process would be revived before US election day 
on 7 November.351 Later, Kissinger tried to defend his premature use of the term ‘peace is at 
hand’ but the truth is that he should have waited to obtain South Vietnamese agreement.352 
Kissinger’s deputy, Alexander Haig, was later very critical. ‘It is hardly possible to imagine a 
phrase, so redolent of Neville Chamberlain and the…cult of appeasement, more likely to 
embarrass Nixon as President and presidential candidate, inflame Thieu’s anxieties, or weaken 
our leverage in Hanoi’.353  
Coming so close to election day, Nixon worried that his opponent, the Democrat George 
McGovern, would accuse him of playing party politics with the peace process.354 In a public 
statement on 2 November, Nixon clarified his position. Kissinger had been correct in that 
‘substantial agreement’ had been reached on ‘most’ of the terms of peace but ‘there are still 
some issues to be resolved’. Determined to avoid the charge of electioneering, Nixon said that 
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‘we are going to sign the agreement when the agreement is right’ and not prematurely just so 
he could deliver on his 1968 promise to end the war in his first term.’355 
In London, FCO officials admitted to ‘confusion’ about the on-off peace process. 
According to Brooks Richards, UK Ambassador in Saigon, who spoke to both American and 
South Vietnamese informants, Kissinger was to blame for the ‘difficulty’ with Thieu whom he 
had tried to force into acceptance at ‘top speed’ but ended up antagonising the ‘slow and 
extremely suspicious’ RVN President. Nevertheless, Richards suspected that the peace 
agreement would soon be ‘patched up’.356 To this end, the US government looked to the UK 
government for support, particularly in dealing with the South Vietnamese. The FCO obliged 
by telling the RVN Ambassador in London that Thieu needed to recognise the advantages in 
‘accepting’ what was clearly ‘the best agreement available’.357 
 
In the event, Nixon won his second term by a landslide. According to the Guardian, the result 
(Nixon won 97% in the electoral college) was a referendum on Vietnam war with the ‘great 
majority of the American people were satisfied’ apparently content with Nixon’s handling of 
the problem.358 Nixon immediately approached Thieu to ask him to reconsider his opposition 
to the peace treaty. The settlement ‘reflects major concessions by the other side, protects the 
independence of South Vietnam, and leaves the political future to the South Vietnamese people 
themselves’, Nixon said. To reject this deal was ‘unfair and self-defeating’ and ‘highly 
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embarrassing’.359 The following week, Nixon offered Thieu his ‘personal assurance’ that if the 
DRV undermined the peace  there would be ‘swift and severe’ US retaliation.360  
Thieu, however, would not budge, and the Americans, unable to shift their ally, turned 
their attention to their enemy. But Hanoi would not tolerate unpicking the agreement reached 
with the US. The problem was Thieu, Tho told Kissinger, which made it a US problem.361 On 
29 November, Nixon then got tough with Thieu and threatened to cut off all US support to 
South Vietnam. ‘Without aid, you can’t survive,’ he told him. ‘Understand?’.362 
With the peace process stuck, the British found themselves in the familiar position of 
trying to ‘penetrate the fog’ on US thinking.363 Taking an optimistic view, the FCO Planning 
Staff considered the role the UK might play if a settlement did still emerge. As Geneva co-
chair, Britain held ‘ill-defined’ responsibilities which it had been ‘unable satisfactorily to 
discharge’ with consequent ‘embarrassing exposure to criticism and pressure from all quarters’. 
Back in 1954, the UK had played a ‘decisive’ role in averting a major conflict and lessening 
international tension so that the co-chairship arose from something worthwhile. Now, Britain 
was potentially facing the prospect of being asked to endorse an ‘embarrassing’ settlement 
which, unlike 1954, it had no hand in devising. The Americans should be supported, planners 
agreed. But this time round the UK should avoid any commitment to preserve the settlement.364  
The FCO Southeast Asia Department concurred. In terms of UK international priorities, 
‘Indochina ranks low’. UK policy should focus on aiding the US to secure an ‘honourable exit’ 
and in providing Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam with moral support. A postwar 
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international conference on the 1954 model might materialise in a post-armistice future and the 
UK should participate with others in helping map out a programme for Southeast Asian 
security. But that same conference should be used to ‘gracefully’ relinquish the 1954 legacy.365 
Summing up, Douglas-Home defined the UK approach as ‘minimum involvement at minimum 
cost’.366 Here, however, the British still had one final Vietnam dilemma to contend with. By 
adopting an aloof attitude in the final phase of the peace process, the UK risked being accused 
by the US of lack of support. But too proactive a position might - as in 1954 - drag Britain into 
shouldering unwanted future burdens.367  
 
The US-DRV exchanges in Paris continued into December, but with the Americans having 
failed to persuade Thieu to be flexible, failure seemed inevitable. On 13 December, Le Duc 
Tho decided to five up and head home.368 Nixon was livid. The following day, he sent an 
ultimatum to North Vietnam to begin talking ‘seriously’ within 72-hours or face American 
wrath. To this end, Nixon ordered the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare ‘massive’ air attacks 
against Hanoi and Haiphong even though, as Kissinger admitted, a settlement with North 
Vietnam was ‘99 percent completed’.369 When the DRV ignored his ultimatum, Nixon ordered 
a new round of bombing to commence on 18 December. Due to the timing, it was dubbed the 
Christmas bombing by the Western media but its actual codename was Linebacker II. Over the 
next eleven days, 40,000 tons of bombs fell on the Hanoi-Haiphong. The single most intensive 
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US aerial bombardment of the DRV in the entire war took place, ironically, after the United 
States and North Vietnam had reached an agreement on peace terms.370  
The reaction both in America and the wider world was overwhelmingly unfavourable. 
The New York Times condemned the administration’s ‘stone age barbarism’, while the Daily 
Mirror in Britain wrote of ‘Nixon’s Christmas Deluge of Death’.371 Nixon later described 
Linebacker II as the ‘most difficult’ but also the most ‘clear-cut and necessary’ decision he 
took in the war.372 Historians, however, contest this claim. ‘The Christmas bombing altered the 
diplomatic landscape by scarcely a jot’, Hastings argues, while Young maintains that ‘nothing 
of substance was changed’.373 On 28 December, the DRV agreed to resume talks, and the 
bombing stopped, but Hanoi’s leaders knew that in the resumed negotiations they would likely 
get what had been offered by the Americans before Linebacker II. As one Nixon aide later 
wrote, ‘we bombed the North Vietnamese into accepting our concessions’.374 Ultimately, the 
bombing was aimed (indirectly) at Thieu to demonstrate what the US could do if the 
communists broke the peace and thus, in this way, persuade him to sign the treaty.375 
In Britain, though the popular reaction was hostile, the Heath government found itself 
in a difficult position. On the one hand, there was the usual need to show backing for the US. 
On the other, as the guardian of 1954, the UK could not really approve of US bombing given 
how close a peace deal was. On 19 December, the US Embassy confirmed to the FCO that 
Kissinger’s belief that peace was ‘99 percent’ there was accurate but blamed the North 
Vietnamese for ‘back-tracking’. The bombing was aimed at getting the negotiations ‘back on 
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track’.376 The FCO felt short-changed at being fed the ‘standard administration line’ and hoped 
that Kissinger might reveal more of the real US motivation in due course.377  
On 21 December, the wording of a government statement sidestepping the issue of the 
bombing was finalised. ‘HMG have always believed the right way to put an end to the Vietnam 
war is by negotiation’ but ‘inexact or loosely drafted agreements…inevitably lead to future 
complications’, it ran.378 Privately, Douglas-Home had sympathy for the Americans. North 
Vietnam, he suspected, hoped to strengthen its position by military success before resuming 
negotiations so the US bombing was not ‘unnatural’.379 Linebacker II put the UK in ‘great 
difficulty’, the British Embassy in Washington admitted, but based on what the Nixon 
administration said publicly about DRV duplicity – since shown by historians not to have 
existed – it was ‘difficult to see what alternative the US government had’ and equally hard for 
the UK government to issue anything other than a muted public statement.380  
Inevitably, the Labour opposition was critical of the Heath government’s failure to 
condemn the ‘slaughter’ caused by US ‘terror bombing’.381 By late December, Douglas-Home 
was warning ministerial colleagues that the earlier public statement was not enough and that 
‘senior ministers will have to comment publicly’. The problem was that the UK remained ‘in 
the dark’ as to what the US authorities were really up to.382 On 28 December, Kissinger 
telephoned Douglas-Home admitting he had been ‘remiss’ in failing to consult properly but 
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also asking that the government ‘hold the line’ in standing up for America.383 Labour, however, 
kept the pressure up with Roy Jenkins, a senior figure in the shadow Cabinet, writing to Heath 
to express despair at the ‘absence of any protest from the British Government’ in response to 
one of the most ‘cold blooded actions in recent history’. Jenkins then made his letter public.384  
That same day, North Vietnam agreed, as we have noted, to resume talks and the 
bombing was stopped along with the pressure on Heath to denounce US policy. The Americans 
informed the British via diplomatic channels that technical US-DRV discussions would resume 
in Paris on 2 January 1973 and Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks soon after.385 No longer under 
pressure to talk about the bombing, on 30 December, Heath, in his first public statement since 
Linebacker II began, welcomed the resumption of negotiations.386 Privately, Nixon told Heath 
he was ‘deeply grateful’ that the Prime Minister had not ‘added his voice to the chorus of 
condemnation’.387 In actual fact the British feared a repeat of recent events - another collapse 
of the peace process and another US bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Second time 
around, Lord Cromer warned the FCO, the government would be ‘heavily pressed’ to protest, 
and Heath, heir to 1954, would struggle to avoid ‘outright condemnation of US policy’.388  
 
In the event the British worried needlessly as peace was agreed surprisingly quickly. On 8 
January 1973, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resumed their discussions. The next day, Nixon’s 
birthday, came the breakthrough. Kissinger telephoned the White House to deliver the good 
news. It was the ‘best birthday present’ he had received ‘in sixty years’, Nixon commented.389 
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Ironically, the breakthrough amounted to the DRV agreeing to sign in January 1973 the deal it 
had agreed to sign in October 1972 – the one the Americans failed to sell to South Vietnam.390 
This time, Thieu had come under fantastic pressure from Nixon to comply, but the US also 
promised South Vietnam lavish postwar financial inducements. In effect, Thieu was warned 
that he no longer had the ‘luxury’ of ‘resisting’.391  
On  23 January, the US-DRV agreement was initialled before a formal four-party peace 
treaty was signed four days later. In a televised broadcast from the Oval Office, Nixon claimed 
to have achieved his ‘peace with honor’.392 It was peace for America, certainly, but not for 
Vietnam. Later, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but 
while Kissinger accepted, Tho refused on the grounds that there was no peace.393  
To ‘welcome’ the signing of the agreement, the FCO in London issued a statement 
expressing relief that the fighting was ended after ‘so many terrible years of conflict’.394 In 
Cabinet, it was agreed that however the settlement played out, the UK should at all costs avoid 
any responsibility for its upkeep as an ‘international umpire’ as it had done with the 1954 
settlement.395 
On 1 February, Heath arrived in Washington for scheduled talks with Nixon. The 
meeting occurred at an ‘auspicious’ moment following the signing of the Paris peace treaty, 
Heath told American reporters. ‘We, in Britain, have greatly admired the steadfastness with 
which you have pursued the objective of securing peace’.396 The majority of the talks took 
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place at Camp David and were ‘completely informal’, Heath recalled, ‘relaxing, and conducive 
to a real exchange of views.397 On Vietnam, Nixon was grateful to Heath for his ‘firm stand’ 
on the Christmas bombing (Heath had been the only European leader not to publicly criticise 
the US). ‘What you did, did not go unnoticed’, Nixon said. Heath felt that all depended on the 
DRV’s readiness to uphold the agreement and, by extension, on US readiness to reopen combat 
involvement if the peace collapsed. Nixon agreed. And agreed, too, that US-UK relations were 
in good order.398  
On his return to London, Heath reported to the Cabinet on ‘very successful’ talks.399 
The “special relationship” was still in place, it seemed, but in the final phase of the Vietnam 
war it had required Heath and his government to condone a US approach to the peace process 
that was disingenuous and violent. Heath, though, was unapologetic. The end, peace, was worth 
the means Nixon used. Within eighteen months, Nixon would have resigned in ignominy over 
Watergate, but Heath did not revise his assessment. ‘What a tragedy’, he lamented in his 
memoirs, ‘that Watergate should have wiped Richard Nixon’s achievements from the public 
mind’.400 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The UK was obviously not directly involved in the closing phase of the US war in Vietnam, 
1969 to 1973, but as in the past – in 1945, for example, when Britain helped restore French 
sovereignty in Indochina, or 1954 when it played the leading role in ending the French war, or 
in 1965 to 1967 when it proposed several peace initiatives – the UK did have a role, mainly 
diplomatic and in connection with its “special relationship” to one of the chief combatants, 
America. The Nixon administration sought UK support for its Vietnam policy and wherever 
possible, the Wilson Labour government (1969-1970), and the Heath Conservative government 
(1970 onwards) tried to supply that support.  
As this dissertation has shown, the UK approach to Vietnam in the concluding phase of 
the American war is a neglected area of historical research - almost as if historians decided that 
once Nixon became US President in January 1969 and dedicated himself to “peace with honor” 
that all UK interest in the issue ceased. This, however, was clearly not true. As this study has 
shown, both Labour and Conservatives governments worried at various times that US policy, 
even in the peace phase of the war, could suddenly turn and dangerous military escalation could 
follow that would draw in China and even the USSR at a time when Cold War détente, which 
the UK approved of, seemed within reach. 
 As previously noted, the main context for UK policy on Vietnam in the 1969-1973 
period was the “special relationship”. UK decisions on Vietnam, and on Laos and Cambodia, 
too, had to be judged against the extent that they supported the US, and therefore the “special 
relationship”, or challenged the US and risked damaging the Anglo-American relationship. The 
Wilson Labour government proved adept at balancing the two parts of this equation; it 
continued to publicly back the Nixon administration but without ever going so far as to give 
unqualified support for US policy, unless it was the Paris peace process, bearing in mind the 
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significant level of anti-American attitudes on the left of the parliamentary Labour party. The 
most unexpected finding of this dissertation was the extent to which Heath and the 
Conservatives backed the United States in public and often without the qualifications that the 
Labour government had added to its own support of America. Heath has the reputation of being 
the most sceptical of all UK postwar leaders about the importance of the Anglo-American 
relationship for Britain and while falling short of being anti-American, he is usually depicted 
as preferring a special relationship between Britain and Europe. Yet on Vietnam - notably the 
Laotian crisis in 1971 and the Christmas bombing of 1972 - the Heath government defied public 
and parliamentary opinion in Britain by refusing to openly condemn US policy. This stance 
was much appreciated by the Nixon administration. 
 This in some ways was probably what Heath wanted – to win goodwill in Washington 
in order to balance out the American suspicion of his pro-European outlook. Since the 1950s 
successive US administrations had approved of the idea of the UK joining the European 
community, but by the early 1970s, US leaders, especially Henry Kissinger but also Nixon at 
times, seemed to have become schizophrenic on this issue. The Nixon administration on the 
one hand publicly backed UK entry to the EEC, but on the other hand it privately complained 
that UK closeness to Europe demanded that the US consult less closely with the UK in case 
private or sensitive information ended up being passed all round Europe by the British 
government. In London, Heath and Douglas-Home and others were aware of this inconsistency 
and by backing US policy on Vietnam - or by not criticising it, which amounted to the same 
thing - they may have hoped to maintain good relations with Washington. Even the pro-
European Heath did not see the future as a choice between a UK special relationship with 
Europe or the US. He seems to have wanted closeness to Europe to act as an additional support 
for the UK not a substitute for the traditional UK relationship with America. However, the fact 
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remains that on Vietnam, Heath’s default position – which may be a surprise to some people – 
was to back Nixon at almost every point. 
 Apart from the UK’s ties to America, another important reason why Britain took more 
than a passing interest in the Vietnam war after 1969 was the legacy of Geneva 1954. Once the 
all-Vietnam reunification elections failed to happen in 1956 and the temporary division of 
Vietnam into a communist north and a non-communist south took on a more permanent quality, 
the UK, along with the USSR, the co-chairs of the 1954 Geneva conference, acquired 
responsibility for getting the situation back to where it was supposed to be according to the 
1954 settlement. Over the years that followed, the ongoing UK responsibility for Geneva was 
both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the positive side, it allowed Britain in the 1960s and 
into the 1970s to retain a high-profile international role on a major issue at a time when more 
generally UK power and influence was felt to be in decline. On the negative side, it did not 
always help Anglo-American relations.  
In the mid-1960s, the UK Labour government used Geneva as a justification for 
refusing to send troops to Vietnam to support the US on the grounds that as the architect of 
1954 the UK needed to be seen to help try and restore peace. This clearly irritated the Johnson 
administration. Later in the 1960s, the Labour government took the lead in trying to broker 
peace initiatives, again because of its commitment to Geneva, and again with the same negative 
impact in the US. As this dissertation has shown, the legacy of 1954 can be seen in the 1969 to 
1973 period but with a difference. While the Wilson government continued to use Geneva as a 
reason to qualify its support of US policy when that policy appeared to be wrong or misguided, 
the Heath government from 1970 found the legacy of 1954 a complicating factor given its 
tendency to seek to back the US on Vietnam. By the end of the war in 1973, the Heath 
government welcomed the Paris peace settlement but was adamant that in contrast to 1954, the 
UK should not assume any responsibility for protecting that agreement going forward. 
96 
 
 To conclude, the UK played a more active diplomatic and political role in the final 
phase of the US war in Vietnam than is often supposed, partly for reasons connected with the 
“special relationship”, and partly for reasons relating to the legacy of Geneva in 1954. In the 
end, the Conservative government of Edward Heath was much more positively pro-American 
than the Labour government of Harold Wilson, and this was probably related to the need to 
win US goodwill in connection with UK EEC entry. At the same time, however, as this study 
has shown, the Heath government privately might not have agreed with US methods in Vietnam 
but it did believe in the importance of containing communism in Southeast Asia, where the UK 
retained Commonwealth and other interests, and to that end that the Nixon administration 
deserved British backing in public. 
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